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Abstract: 
Peace studies in its interdisciplinary and intercultural character acknowledges the 
plurality of understandings of peace. Moreover, the epistemological statute of the 
discipline has been revised contesting the value-free approach of modern science, and 
expanding the notion of scientificity. This thesis looks at the relation of peace studies 
with other forms of producing knowledge, and examines if cultural recognition in peace 
studies is accompanied by epistemological recognition. To that effect, interculturality in 
the work of four peace scholars is analyzed. Thereon, a dialogic proposal is carried out. 
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Introduction 
Presentation and justification   
This thesis addresses the question of the relations between science and other 
forms of producing knowledge and conceiving existence, and concretely how it has or 
can been dealt in peace studies. It departs from two premises: on one side, from the 
commitment of the UNESCO Char of Philosophy for Peace to relieve the suffering 
between humans and with nature; on the other side, from De Sousa Santos (2007b) 
tenet that there is no social justice without cognitive justice. 
Colonialism, considered in this thesis as one of the constitutive elements of 
what has been called modernity, the imposition of modern science as the only valid 
form of knowledge has led to the destruction of the diversity of ways of producing 
knowledge. This has consequences at many levels, since, contrary to the hegemonic 
modern science stances that separate (or hide) epistemology and ontology from 
politics, the form of producing knowledge and conceiving existence is closely linked 
to the form of conceiving and organizing relations between humans and non-humans, 
in a social, economic, spiritual and cultural way. 
 Therefore, one of these consequences is the deprival by modern science of the 
way certain groups of people experience the world on their own terms (Santos, 2010). 
Another consequence, and closely related to the first one, is the impoverishment of 
the world by this monoculture of knowledge, affecting us all, humanity and non-
humanity. To illustrate this, in the first chapter I establish an analogy between a forest 
as a complex set of interwoven relations and a forest product of the  state intervention 
that implements a monoculture program for economic reasons. This impoverishment 
of human diversity has reduced our capabilities to respond to common threats that, in 
different degree, affect all humanity.  
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To that effect, this thesis proposes to look at the forms of knowledge and 
existence of these groups that suffer from the imposition of Western epistemes and 
how they resist and creatively combine them. This thesis proposes to look at these 
neglected traditions which, not only have value and utility in themselves, but can also 
provide lessons in the light of dominant economic, political, ecologic paradigms 
(Comaroff, 2012; Santos, 2010; Gomes, 2012). However, in order to do that, as some 
scholars have argued, (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Santos, 2010), the Eurocentric 
arrogance that has disabled the West to learn from other experiences must be rejected. 
How this can be carried out is a question with neither a single nor an easy 
answer. Thinkers from other disciplines like Raimón Panikkar (1990) or De Sousa 
Santos (2010) propose dialogue and intercultural translation, to establish first a 
middle ground where different traditions can meet without one imposing the terms on 
the others. Santos (2010), who will be one of the main theoretical actors in this thesis, 
calls for a “counter-hegemonic globalization”, by gathering together social groups 
and movements whose perspectives have been neglected, and to engage in dialogic 
and cooperative relations to subvert imbalanced relations. 
Dialogue and interdisciplinarity are not alien notions to peace studies and to 
peace practices. Neither is interculturality. Several authors (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; 
Galtung, 1996; Dietrich, 1997) have talked about peace in plural to outline the 
importance of recognizing other voices and understandings of peace besides and 
beyond the Western concepts and views. Furthermore, the epistemological statute of 
the discipline has been revised (Galtung, 1996; Martínez Guzmán, 2001) pointing 
towards the expansion of the inner limits of science, towards a broader, more 
inclusive notion of scientificity.  
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However, as Alastair Mcintosh (2012) posits concerning indigenous 
knowledge, these pose a challenge to the academy. What has been called, indigenous 
“onto-epistemologies” (MacIntosh, 2012), embodied knowledges that do not separate 
doing, living, feeling and acting from knowing, challenge many modern dichotomies. 
The result of this tension has been the incorporation or assimilation into modern 
science paradigms. Following this line of argument, to ask an indigenous group what 
is peace for them, writing it down and producing theory, would not it be a Western 
question? Would not it fall into assimilation or appropriation? I endeavor to explore if 
cultural recognition in peace studies is accompanied by epistemological recognition. 
Personal motivations 
To situate the motivations of this thesis I could trace back four years ago when I 
naively found myself in Niger as a part of a development project. My initial ingenuity 
gradually gave way to a sort of stupor as the blindness and assertive attitude in certain 
aspects of the development system were revealed to me. This contrasted with what 
was occurring outside of the offices, where multiple ‘informal’ economic practices, of 
modes of production and redistribution, of ways of social organization and 
communication, and of ways to relating to the world, were creatively taking place, 
not exempt of suffering. That led me to think that rather than teach, I should learn.  
That learning commitment was one of the reasons that brought me to this 
program, which revealed full of enriching and unexpected theoretical and practical 
experiences. To name two, the critical thinking and the post-colonial aspects of the 
Philosophy for Peace class raised many questions concerning the awareness or the 
lack of it, of my position in the world. From the political ecology approach of the 
Sustainable Development and Environment class, it was revealed to me how politics 
are implicated in environmental practices, and how other forms of knowledge 
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originate other practices. Thus, if as it was stated earlier epistemology is politics, I 
might look at the former to see the roots of other power relations, and of other 
politics. 
At the same time, my come back to Spain, amidst of a not only economic crisis, 
but also a downturn mood, and a sense of stagnation at different levels, albeit 
counterpointed by bold mushrooming initiatives, made me reflect on the imagination 
and creativity that in other contexts is employed to cope with difficult situations. 
Thesis statement 
Peace studies has opened up to other voices and understandings of peace. 
However, in spite of the  epistemological proposals leading to expand the limits of the 
discipline, the treatment of interculturality may still reflect the dominance of Western   
modern science. I want to explore how Peace Studies might go beyond the dominant 
paradigm, based on appropriation and assimilation, towards epistemological 
recognition, and create spaces for dialogue with other forms of producing knowledge. 
Objectives 
The general objective of this thesis is to inquire on the relation of peace studies 
with other forms of producing knowledge. This is structured around three specific 
objectives: 
1) To analyze how epistemological and ontological diversity has been dealt in 
peace Studies.  
2) To situate, problematize and promote the debate on the unequal relations 
between different forms of knowledge within the frame of the UNESCO Chair 
of Philosophy for Peace and peace studies in general.   
3) To explore how peace studies can engage in equal dialogues with other 
understandings of peace beyond the dominant scientific paradigm. 
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Outline of the thesis 
The thesis will be structured into three chapters. 
The first chapter establishes the theoretical foundations for the rest of the thesis, 
and sets the basis for the analysis carried out in the second chapter. Although not 
exhaustive,  it reviews literature in regards to the position of science as the hegemonic 
form of knowledge, it presents a brief discussion on modernity and modern Western 
rationality, it inquiries into colonialism and the construction of the other, and 
confronts the works of several authors concerning the subversion of this dominant 
relation. It ends by situating peace studies, concretely the UNESCO Chair of 
Philosophy for Peace within the debate. This chapter will be the base upon which the 
case studies of the following chapter will be built. 
The second chapter will start by introducing an important conceptual tool for 
the analysis. Thereon, the work of four peace scholars will be critically analyzed, 
focusing on the treatment of interculturality and of non-Westerns understandings of 
peace. In each case, their epistemological position will be clarified and critically 
analyzed, to then confront the above mentioned aspects of their work with the 
theoretical framework of the first chapter and with new theoretical incorporations. 
The third chapter proposes a change of mood in the thesis. It delves into Fulani 
people of Niger, cosmology, practices and beliefs. Why I decided to focus on Fulani, 
is basically due to the close relationships of my everyday life in what not long ago 
was a Fulani village, now turned into a neighborhood of Niamey. These interactions 
resulting from the hospitality by which I was received was accompanied by openness 
to share many aspects and concerns of their culture. I do not explicitly use personal 
reflections from those everyday interactions, although my own voice as an author was 
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certainly influenced by these relations. Moreover, this chapter focuses on Wodaabe 
Fulani, nomadic herders from the Southeastern region whose presence in the capital 
city is temporary and as migrant labor, as it is explained in the chapter.  
In this chapter, I will first briefly define my position in regards to ethnicity and 
Fulani identity. Theron, I will particularly focus on certain aspects of their 
cosmology, economic and social practices, relations with the state and development 
agents, moral conceptions, ways of dealing with conflict, and their relation with the 
environment, attachment to the land and their sense of place. At this particular point 
an homology will be established with other traditions that express similar concerns, 
namely the Germanic concept Heimatkunde, and Aymara cosmology. Finally, the 
perspective of the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace will be brought into this 
dialogue. 
The last section summarizes the chapters, presents some conclusions, and hints 
at some possible directions for future research. 
Scope of the research 
In this section I define the limits that I established to define the chapters. 
However, this section may need to be complemented with the reflections on the 
limitations provided at the end of the thesis.  
Modern science, partly because it lies in its own nature and spirit, has been an 
object of debate, revision and criticism concerning the epistemological, sociological 
and political inner limits, and the different forms of practicing science. This has been 
conducive to overcome old paradigms in regards to theoretical currents, 
methodologies, the marginalization of certain groups as subjects, the relations with 
the object of study, the autonomy of the scientist concerning the state, research 
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agencies and economic institutions (Santos, 2007b). These debates, also present in 
peace studies, have been fed by the contributions of feminists, social and cultural 
studies, without forgetting the contributions of disciplines like physics or biology. 
However, as it has been stated, this thesis in general, and the first chapter in 
particular, do not intend to deal with these aspects, but proposes a look to the 
conditions of possibility that led to the exclusivity of science concerning other forms 
of producing knowledge. How these relations have been established, which dialogic 
possibilities have been or can be opened. 
The second chapter analyzes four cases studies of how interculturality has been 
dealt from a Western epistemological perspective. The last case study covers the 
organization Peaceful Societies which publishes his work on the website 
www.peacefulsocieties.org. It is coordinated by Bruce D. Bonta who gathers the work 
of other scholars whose contributions form the Encyclopedia of Peaceful societies.    
The other three cases cover the work of Wolfgang Dietrich, Johan Galtung, and 
Douglas P. Fry. The selection of these scholars that contribute to peace studies from 
different disciplinary perspectives, philosophy, sociology, psychology and 
anthropology responds to the need to provide – within the space and time limitations– 
a sample that tries to show the broad disciplinary, methodological and 
epistemological spectrum of peace studies. This is not intended to be considered as 
exhaustive. 
The third chapter focused on Fulani nomadic herders, dedicating special 
attention certain aspects of Fulani worldview, knowledge and rituals, and its intricacy 
with their economic, social and ecological practices. The last section of the chapter 
delved into the relation with the environment and the practices that connect them to 
the land.  
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Methodology and theoretical framework 
To set the aforementioned objectives this thesis employs a qualitative 
methodology, based on secondary sources, and out of a critical analysis and 
discussion of the literature reviewed. This thesis enhances the importance of an 
interdisciplinary approach. 
The literature review on the first chapter is based mainly on post-colonial 
scholars such as Dipak Chakrabarty (2000), Gayatry Spivak (1998), Enrique Dussel 
(2000), Ania Loomba (1998), and Santiago Castro-Gómez (2000). Concerning the 
reconstructive proposals on the debate, I will confront briefly Walter Mignolo’s 
position with de Sousa Santos’, right after I will extend on the work of the latter. To 
situate peace scholars within the debate I will draw on the work of Wolfgang Dietrich 
(1997) and Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001). 
The second chapter will confront the treatment of interculturality by four peace 
scholars with the theoretical framework of the first chapter. New analytical tools will 
be added to that effect. Namely, the concept of categorical violence from James Scott, 
and the work of anthropologists like Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2010), Tim Ingold 
(2000, 2011), and Alberto Gomes (2012). Furthermore, the work of Edward Said 
(2012), Vandana Shiva (1988), Ramachandra Guha (1989) will play an important role 
in certain sections of the critical analysis. Finally, a deductive approach will be 
followed to draw some conclusions. 
For the chapter on Wodabee Fulani I have relied on Fulani texts from their oral 
tradition (Ba and Dieterlen, 1961; Amougou, 2009), for I considered that these tales, 
mythologies and poetry have presence in the everyday life through the work of griots, 
in radio broadcasts or cultural and social events. 
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Concerning scholar work, I have relied on Fulani scholars such as Salamatou 
Sow and Iba Fall, whose contributions were relevant to certain aspects dealt in the 
chapter. There is a considerable literature on Fulani in the fields of anthropology, 
linguistics and development economics. There is also a considerable quantity of 
media coverage on Fulani. However, both scholar and media tend to measure Fulani 
worldviews and practices in the light of Western values, and beliefs and standards. 
Moreover, certain reveal a tendency either to vilify (Lott and Hart, 1977), or to 
romanticize (Loftsdottir, 2001) this group of people. Therefore, it has not been an 
easy task to find literature that present Fulani people as active and autonomous 
epistemological and ontological subjects. On that basis, I have considered that the 
anthropological contributions of Kris Loftdottir (2001, 2007), Paul Riesman (1977), 
Nicholaus Schareika (2010) would meet these requirements. 
The section that deals with Heitmatkunde  was entirely sustained by the 
contributions of ethnologist Ullrich Kockel, and to a lesser extent, of Egbert Daum 
(2007). Concerning Aymara cosmology I relied on the work of ethnographer and 
philosopher Rodolfo Kusch, and his approach to think from indigenous and popular 
thought, rather than to think about or over it. In the corresponding section of the third 
chapter I will introduce Kusch methodology in more detail and my position towards 
it. 
Final considerations 
Philosopher Mogobe Ramose (2013: 213) use the concept Africa “under 
protest” to refer to how the continent was baptised by Greeks and Romans. What was 
initially meant to designate the northern part of the continent was extended to the rest 
of it by means of the “power to dictate the meaning of experience, knowledge and 
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truth on behalf of others.” Like the father baptises the child, terms like indigenous 
people denote that power imbalances that allow encompassing multiple experiences 
into a single category.   
This does not only have consequences at the level of signs, like discourse is 
understood in linguistics. For Foucault (1970) discourse consists in a series of 
statements and practices that form and limit the object which they refer to. According 
to the author, discourse lies at the intersection between power and knowledge since it 
is one of the mechanisms through which a normative and disciplinary power is 
reproduced and legitimized. Through this discursive power regimes of truth are 
created, which determine and regulate what is considered to be normal or acceptable, 
depriving the different as inferior. 
 Therefore, it is not with discomfort that I unavoidably employ terms like West, 
non-West, North, South, Europe, or indigenous; terms which imply division and 
denote the asymetrical relations that I attempt to bring to the debate. These tensions 
and contradictions derived from knowledge production can be made visible by a 
critical use of these terms, and it is by using them that they can be criticized. 
I want to precise too that throughout this thesis I employ the concept 
epistemology to refer to, ways of knowing, and ontology to ways of conceiving 
existence. 
Before delving into the thesis, and since a critique of Eurocentrism is going to 
be a recurrent element in the first two chapters, I consider that another beforehand 
precision might be convenient here, since it too raised certain discomfort during the 
writing process. Firstly, too much focus on criticizing Eurocentrism might definitely 
place Europe at the center again, which is contrary to the objective that I had set. 
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Secondly, and related to the first, an excessive anger in the name of others might end 
up positing my own (self-righteous) voice at the center, which is a Eurocentric 
deviation. I hope not to have fallen in these traps. Notwithstanding, I do not consider 
this to be incompatible with connection with other people’s struggles and with 
denouncing unequal relations, for one of the lessons that I personally draw from the 
cultural perspectives in this research is the sense of togetherness, that there are things 
that affects us all. 
 
  
 12 
 
 
  
 13 
 
Chapter I 
From monoculture to a polyculture of knowledges 
“definitions belong to the definers –not the defined.” 
(Toni Morrison, 1987: 190) 
Introduction 
James C. Scott (1998: 13-21) describes the role of scientific forestry 
advocated by the early European modern states in facilitating their functions and 
satisfying their economic purposes of timber production. In the already existing 
utilitarian view of nature, the multiple possibilities offered by the forest were yet to 
be narrowed down for the state interests, and reduced to the formula tree equals 
lumber. Leaving aside the intrinsic value of nature, and the complexity of all the 
negotiated social uses for pasturage, hunting, fishing, gathering, poaching, 
sheltering, dwelling, rituals and other symbolic uses, the Prussian and Saxon states 
pioneered the politics of monoculture by engaging in a systematic plan based on 
reductionist principles for, first, calculating, planning and designing a forest as 
productive as possible; and second, by transforming the old, diverse, seemingly 
chaotic and purportedly inefficient forest into a new forest,  rationally ordered, the 
product of scientists’ and state officials’ imaginary, thus turning  reality into 
abstraction. This standardized laboratory forest whose homogeneity and uniformity 
considerably simplified the variables to be considered –same age, same size, same 
species, same distance- was easier to assess, manipulate and manage. 
 This simplification process facilitated the study and the introduction of the 
more efficient species for timber production. The commodification of the forest 
offered, in the short term, successful results in terms of wood production, leading 
to the expansion of the method to other European countries. However, 100 years 
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later, after the second generation of trees was planted, the negative consequences of 
the monoculture became apparent, and the ecological imbalance affected the yield 
to the extent that a new term was coined, Waldsterben (dead forest). The 
interwoven mesh of relations between fauna, flora, fungi, soil, insects and nutrients 
had been ignored and impaired. The reduction of diversity turned the soil and the 
ecosystem less resilient, more fragile and vulnerable to pests, stress, disease, 
epidemics and weather severities. Apart from the economic losses due to lower  
yields production, extra expenses had to be dedicated to fertilizers, insecticides, 
fungicide, reintroduction of species, raising, nesting, and restoration practices with 
irregular results, and a single objective: to reproduce the lost ecological complexity 
and diversity. 
Different readings can be made from the above-exposed account, my  
intention is to establish an analogical connection between the simplified shaping of 
the forest in Western science and the way and the effects of the dominance and 
exclusivity of scientific rationality as the only valid form of knowledge. The 
resulting landscape could be very similar to that Prussian Waldsterben. This 
chapter focuses on how the transition from a polyculture of knowledges to the 
monoculture of science, via colonial relations, has led to the ignorance and/or 
erasure of other forms of knowledge, considered inferior, local, or contextual. This 
“epistemicide”, in Boaventura De Sousa Santos (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 
2007b: ixx) words, affect directly certain specific social groups, indigenous, 
peasants, mostly non-Western, by dispossessing them of their traditional ways to 
perceive, experience, and make sense of the world. Moreover, the consequences of 
the reduction of the epistemological diversity have resulted in “orthopedic 
thinking” (Santos, 2009:110) –the limitations derived from the analysis of 
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problems with conceptual tools strange to them– with direct consequences on the 
whole humankind. Western societies find themselves in the dead-end street of the 
“dwarfed reason” (McIntosh, 2012) where it is assumed that the way we are living, 
feeling and known is the only and the right one, with the consequent 
impoverishment of human existence in political, cultural, social, economic, sexual, 
ecologic and spiritual ways, by limiting it to the frames of modern science and its 
rationality. 
All along this chapter I will deal with the issues that spring from our 
impoverished soils, their causes and their consequences. Therefore, I have divided 
it into four sections. 
The first two sections will examine the “conditions of possibility”, that is, the 
social, historical, cultural and epistemological context (Mudimbe, 1988: 9), which 
made possible the emergence and universalization of modern science and Western 
rationality.  
The first section will examine Cartesian ontology as the epistemological roots 
of modern science and Western rationality. The split of body from mind, and 
human from nature led to a series of dichotomies that undergird Western view of 
reality. The contribution of Descartes, Newton, Hobbes, considered three of the 
pillars of European modernity will be discussed. 
Starting from the basis that the colonial logic pervades under the forms of 
imperialism, neo-colonialism or global capitalism, the second section analyzes the 
colonial construction of the ‘other’. It contextualizes Western rationality and 
modern science by considering modernity and colonialism as constitutive of each 
other. With colonialism, the concept of man detached from nature was narrowed 
down to the European, white male of the Enlightenment. Based on a self-
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proclaimed ontological and epistemological superiority, the colonized people were 
denied of their subjectivity, treated as inferior, and deprived of their own ways of 
live (Dussel, 2000; Latour, 1993). The role of natural and social sciences in the 
temporal and racial classification of people will be analyzed, mainly through the 
work of post-colonial scholars such as Aníbal Quijano (2000), Achille Mbembe 
(2001) or Gayatri Spivak (1988). 
The third section will briefly present the debate on Western rationality and 
modern science from postmodern and post-colonial perspectives; concretely Walter 
Mignolo’s view of epistemic de-linking. Finally, I will extend on Boaventura De 
Sousa Santos’ Epistemologies of the South as a proposal that points towards a 
common, counter-hegemonic construction of knowledge based on the experiences 
and forms of knowledge that have been discarded by the imposition of Eurocentric 
paradigms of modern science. 
The last section attempts to situate Peace Studies and the UNESCO Chair of 
Philosophy for Peace within the debate by drawing on the contributions of Vicent 
Martínez Guzmán (2001, 2009) epistemological shift.  
 
1.1 The Man and the Rest 
One of the main characteristics of modern science and Western rationality, 
starting from the subject/object distinction, is its dualistic character and its binary 
and dichotomy producing logic ( Lander, 2000; Santos, 1992; Castro-Gómez, 2000; 
Anzaldúa, 1987, Willems-Braun, 1997). This dualistic thinking, origin of 
separations like mind/matter, human/nature, nature/culture, individual/society, 
savage/civilization, organic/inorganic, secular/sacred, traditional/modern, 
local/universal, advanced/backward,  individual/society, transcendence/immanence 
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lie at the roots of the objective and universal character of scientific  knowledge. As 
it will be examined in the next section, these separations are linked to to the 
distinctions between the hegemonic form of knowledge, and that of the subaltern 
cultures (Lander, 2000: 20). 
Lynn White (1967) traces the separation of human from nature, and the 
consequent exploitation of the latter, back to the Judeo-Christian tradition. 
However, it was with Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon contributions in the 
seventeenth-century when this view of nature as an object, an empty space at 
human disposal, crystallized epistemologically and methodologically. This implied 
the definitive rupture, initiated a century before during the so-called Scientific 
Revolution, with Aristotelian and medieval knowledge, and a whole new stance 
towards the world and life (Santos, 1992:13).  
Descartes split between mind and body, reason and matter, depicts an 
objectified portrait of nature, a functional, mechanistic worldview that situates the 
man as a reasoning, objective observer apart from it (Apffel-Marglin, 1996; 
McIntosh, 2012). This “ontological cleft” (Apffel-Marglin, 1996:3) voided the 
world from any possible meaning, a dead extension, in contrast to the organic 
worldview that had prevailed until then. As Apffel-Marglin (1996: 3) argues, “The 
cosmos became what it is for citizens of the modern world, a despiritualized 
mechanism to be grasped by concepts and representations constructed by reason”. 
Disengaged from the sacred and from any ethical concerns, the world and the 
living organisms were to be viewed (by the uninvolved observer) as machines that 
could be studied and understood by separating its building objects and reducing it 
to the basic material as if studying the functioning of the clockwork (Capra, 1982: 
23). Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gomez, as quoted in Mignolo 
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(2009:1), describes this as the “hubris of the zero point”, the detached position 
where the Enlightenment man situates (hides) himself as the knowing subject from 
where he classifies, explains and orders the world objectively (to his convenience).   
The Cartesian disenchanted concept of the world based on separations, 
(Lander, 2000: 13) set the epistemological and ontological premises for the 
decontextualized production of knowledge, a trait of Western rationality not shared 
by other cultures where different ontological assumptions result in different forms 
of knowledge (Apffel-Marglin, 1996:7; Ingold, 2000).  
At this point, it would perhaps be appropriate to digress in order to briefly 
present the existence of other cases that differ from Western rationality. Although 
the aim of this thesis is not to interpret indigenous thought, but, paraphrasing 
Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (2010: 201), to experiment with it, and therefore, with 
ours, it may be important to turn to other ways of conceiving existence and 
knowledge that might allow us to de-reify the claims for objectivity and 
universality of Western rationality (Lander, 2000:12). Georg Lukácks (1971) uses 
the term reification to refer to the process by which things are made to look as 
natural, hiding other implications. 
 Carlos Lenkersdorf’s (1996) study of Tojolabal cosmology through their 
language shows what he defines as an intersubjective language, without 
subordination resulting from the subject/object distinction. For example, the 
English sentence ‘I told you’, in Tojolabal would be expressed as ‘I told. You 
listened’. Instead of the subject- object English construction, the Mayan language 
implies two subjects and two actions that complement each other. The object, the 
thing said is not expressed since it is implicit in the verbs used. The two subjects 
are at the same time active and passive, the one who talks listens to the listener, and 
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the listener talks to the talker. The importance of listening is enhanced in Tojolabal 
culture regarding respect for the other, learning from it, and fostering the sense of 
community over the individual.  This sense of the communal appears when using 
the first person plural pronoun to talk about nature.   
Oyéronké Oyewùmí (1997; quoted in Lugones, 2000: 8) argues that before 
colonization, Yoruba society had not a dualistic gender distinction to organize 
society hierarchically. The mistranslation of their terms obinrin and okunrin into 
the English female and male respectively, implied a binary opposition of gender 
that did not exist until then. The introduction of the concept of women as opposed 
to men, was used by the colonial machinery to remove women from the public 
sphere, by attributing them the role that women had in the metropolis.  
Tim Ingold accounts of hunter-gatherer societies show how their relation to 
nature differs from Western rationality by not separating between an external 
reality which has to be deciphered and codified by the mind “as a precondition for 
effective action” (Ingold, 2000: 42). For the Objiwa people, the formation of the 
self and that of the environment are part of the same process. To know a person 
does not mean to go into his mind, but to go out in the world. The self is not 
conceived as locked in a body that gathers information of its surroundings, but “as 
a being in the world, caught up in an ongoing set of relationships with components 
of the lived-in environment” (Ingold, 2000: 100; italics in the original).  In relation 
to this, the author outlines the importance of dreaming for the production of 
knowledge since, rather than a break from reality, it represents an extension of this 
open up to the world ontology, it implies complete freedom to wander through the 
spaces that define everyday life (Ingold, 2000: 101-102).  
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 Anthropologist Eduardo Viveiro de Castro (2010: 34, 54) posits the 
inadequacy of the nature/culture dichotomy, and all the binary distinctions that 
spring from it, when considering non-Western cosmologies. The author coined the 
term multinaturalism, in contrast to multiculturalism, to refer to Amerindian 
thought. Whereas multinaturalism starting point is the unity of nature and the 
multiplicity of cultures –grounded on the universality and objectivity of body and 
matter, and the subjectivity of meanings respectively– the Amerindians conceive 
the unity of the spirit and the diversity of bodies. The unity of spirit comes from the 
Amerindian understanding that everything that exists can be considered as 
thinking, as a “cosmological subject”, it exists, therefore it thinks.   If transposed to 
Western thought, in multinaturalism culture would be universal, and nature would 
represent the particular. 
The Yoruba, Tojolobal and Objiwa relational sense of the self, connecting 
knowledge with Being, engaging with the environment instead of detaching from 
it, contrast sharply with Cartesian reductionism. This becomes relevant because of 
the exclusionist character of the latter supported by its claim for certainty, 
objectivity, and a value-free science (Capra, 1982:95). In spite of its cultural 
specificity (Apffel-Marglin, 1996: 9), modern science denied rationality to any 
other form that does not respect its epistemological principles and methodological 
rules (Santos, 1992:13). It also promoted the distinction between the non-expert 
and the expert as the only legitimate knowledge-holder (Shiva, 1988: 88).  
By stating the cultural specificity of scientific rationality I am not making a 
claim for cultural relativism, I intend, as Chakrabarty (2000: 43) posits, “a matter 
of documenting how—through what historical process—‘its reason’, which was 
not always self-evident to everyone, has been made to look obvious far beyond the 
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ground where it originated.” The aim is to point at the logic and the elements that 
led to the expansion and subsequent naturalization of European rationality. The 
claimed superiority of the emerging model over the rest was materialized through 
the convergence of a series of political, cultural, and economic processes which 
will be dealt with the next section in this chapter.  
As it was mentioned above, Francis Bacon was another important figure in 
the ‘othering’ of nature, whose contributions, together with Descartes, resulted in 
nineteenth-century positivism. In his search of the human as “the master and the 
owner of nature” (Santos, 1992:13), Bacon developed a scientific method to free 
the observer from the inherent constraints of human condition. Based on 
observation, induction of axioms, and testing the results for further observations, 
Bacon designed a mechanical process to go from the particular to the general 
without the interference of the observer’s characteristics’ (Bajaj, 1988:19-23). 
The synthesis of Bacon’s inductive empirical method, Descartes deductive 
and mechanistic worldview, and the previous findings of the Scientific Revolution 
was achieved by Newtonian mechanical physics. The codification of the laws of 
the universe reinforced the position of mathematics as the universal language for 
analysis and representation, and reaffirmed the view of the universe as an 
extension, a quantifiable, passive, ordered object. This theory of the universe 
became the model to be followed by natural sciences during the Enlightenment, 
and in its turn, for social scientists in the nineteenth century (Capra, 1982: 48-52). 
Another important point of rupture with Aristotelian thought was that produced by 
the work of Thomas Hobbes. For Hobbes, a move was needed from the state of 
nature to civil society. If nature represented the irrational, anarchy, myth, chaos, 
dreams and fantasies, civil society is based on science, rationality, order, and 
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stability. This move would be provided by the state or the sovereign through a 
contract with its citizens where the former has the monopoly of violence, providing 
peace and security in exchange of the natural rights (Visvanathan, 1988: 99-100). 
For Shiv Visvanathan (1988), the importance of Hobbes thought lies in his view of 
society as a scientific project. By linking science with society, the origin of society 
does not lie in a contract but in a theorem, “the state as the source of ultimate 
power does not antedate science; it is coterminal with science. In that sense, 
science is the civics of the Hobbesian world. To be is to be scientific, and to 
become in every sense of the term a subject and citizen” (Visvanathan, 1988:100).  
The order/anarchy dichotomy and its relation to nature and society would 
become one of the pillars for the subsequent construction of other dualisms 
regarding progress, development, knowledges, and civilization. This dichotomy 
still pervades in the assumptions of the main currents of disciplines like 
International Relations (Grovogui, 2006: 85), so it does in the contemporary 
imaginary derived from the naturalization of science (Lander, 2000: 22) 
The set of divisions explored so far constitute what Bruno Latour (1993: 99) 
calls the “Internal Great Divide”, that between human and non-humans. Western 
unique separation of nature from culture, and science from society, will be used to 
differentiate, and classify humans hierarchically, “the External Great Divide”, 
which will be covered in the next section.  
1.2 The dark sides of modernity 
The epistemological confidence of the seventeenth-century conflated with a 
series of processes and changes taking place in European society at economic, 
cultural, political, religious, and scientific levels that were breaking with the culture 
of the time, setting the frames for capitalism and the imperialist expansion. What 
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has been called modernity it is a much contested concept in terms of definition, 
chronology, main features, and the form and spaces that it covered.  
Some authors talk about modernities, in plural, to refer to the different 
cultural and material interactions that the encounter with the West has provoked, a 
variety of responses, contingencies, temporalities and spatialities, resulting in a 
plurality of modernities (Appadurai, 1996; Chakrabarty, 2000; Willems-Braun, 
1997; Lander, 2000; Comaroff, 2012; Santos, Nunes and Meneses 2007; Grovogui, 
2006). 
Wolfgang Dietrich and Wolfgang Sützl (1997:283) define modernity from  
an Euro-centered point of view as “the societal project characterized by Newtonian 
physics, Cartesian reductionism, the nation state of Thomas Hobbes, and the 
capitalist world system.”  
For this chapter, I will use a post-colonial perspective due to its concern with 
the dominant discourse of the West, and the special attention it dedicates to such 
questions as who produces knowledge, in which context, and to whom is addressed 
(Santos 2007a: 44). Post-colonial Studies, although difficult to define due to its 
heterogeneity, focus on the effects of colonialism, and the cultural, discursive, 
epistemological and political remnants in current social, and cultural practices 
(Willems-Braun, 1997:3). The post-colonial project questions Western assumptions 
of moral superiority which have served to justify past and present power relations; 
it deconstructs the centrality of the West as a political and cultural authority, and 
the role played by its knowledge which constituted an integral part of colonialism 
(Omar, 2008: 228).  
From a post-colonial standpoint, Castro-Gómez (2000), emphasizes the 
relation between modernity and colonialism as constitutive of each other.  Enrique 
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Dussel (2000: 43-46) stands for a reconsideration of the concept of modernity and 
criticizes the dominant view as a parochial, Eurocentric stance on modernity. The 
author proposes a broader view of the modern world not only limited to the events 
taking place within Europe. The intra-European side of modernity based on 
rationality had its counterpoint in an extra-European process characterized by the 
violence and irrationality legitimized by the first one. Dussel posits that the XVI 
century did not imply a rupture with the Middle Age, but the beginning of the 
world history, started with the Portuguese and Spanish expansion, where Europe 
locates itself at the center of it and the rest at its periphery. This ethnocentric 
position of Europe distinguished itself from other ethnocentrisms by its universalist 
claim. In the same line, Santos, Nunes and Meneses (2007:55), argue that the 
regulation/ emancipation dialectics constitutive of modernity only took place 
within metropolitan societies, the colonized ones could only opt between the 
violence of repression and that of assimilation: 
The dominant versions of the paradigm of modernity turned the infinite into 
an obstacle to overcome: the infinite is the infinite zeal to overcome it, 
controlling it, taming it, reducing it to finite proportions. Thus, infinitude, 
which from the outset ought to arouse humility, becomes the ultimate 
foundation of the triumphalism underlying the hegemonic rationality, that of 
orthopedic thinking (Santos, 2009:114). 
The lack of humility and its etymological relation to human that relates both 
to the earth, the ground (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 28) might be the starting point. 
The epistemological confidence showed by Descartes, Bacon, and Newton, turned 
into the arrogance and self-consciousness of the universalist project (Apffel-
Marglin, 1996; Grovogui, 2006; Santos, 2007a, 2009, 1992).  
In order to accomplish this universalizing mission, which has taken different 
forms –civilization, evangelization, modernization, development, globalization– 
(Lander, 2000) Europe was culturally and ideologically constructed as a mythic, 
 25 
 
unified, eternal West built on the pillars of  a shared race, religion, an intellectual 
tradition, and the figure of ‘other’ (Amin, 1989:166). Western teleology 
exemplified by Kant, Hegel, Locke, Montesquieu, posited the moral, political and 
historical unity of Europe despite its internal conflicts (Grovogui, 2006: 115).  
Its counterpart, the ‘other’, is fictionalized in negative terms. The ‘other’, as 
Achille Mbembe (2001:4) points in regards to the discourse on Africa,  
stands out as the supreme receptacle of the West’s obsession with, and 
circular discourse about, the facts of ‘absence,’ ‘lack,’ and ‘non-being’, of 
identity and difference, of negativeness—in short, of nothingness.  
The problem lies not only in that the West portrayed itself “as other than the 
other”, (Mbembe, 2001: 4) but also, more importantly, in that  
to differ from something or somebody is not simply not to be like (in the 
sense of being identical or being-other); it is also not to be at all (non-
being). More, it is being nothing (nothingness) (Mbembe, 2001: 4; italics in 
the original).  
Fanon’s zone of nonbeing, “an extraordinarily sterile and arid region, an 
utterly naked declivity where an authentic upheaval can be born” (Fanon, 1967: 
20), is also rescued by Santos (2007b) in his abyssal thinking, a system of visible 
and invisible distinctions that create a line that separates the two sides, the 
hegemonic from the nonexistent. The abyssal thinking requires a sociology of 
absences, this will be covered in the next section dedicated to the author’s 
proposals. 
The process of othering was grounded on ontological and epistemological 
reasons. As it was hinted in the previous section, the Internal Great Divide 
“accounts for the External Great Divide” (Latour, 1993:99). The ability to 
distinguish nature from culture, and science from society is used to separate the 
Western from the other, it defines the premodern/modern distinction. The 
premodern cannot separate thing from sign, “what comes from Nature as it is from 
 26 
 
what their cultures require” (Latour, 1993:99). The premodern lives trapped in that 
‘confusion’, whereas the modern has liberated itself from the social and the 
language through scientific knowledge (Latour, 1993:99-100). In short, the non-
Western, the other, is defined by its ontological and epistemological inferiority, 
which is instrumentalized to justify and legitimize the universalist project (Lander, 
2000; Grovogui, 2006, Spivak, 1988). From the original dichotomy mind/ matter, 
the Man and the Rest explained in the previous section, with colonialism and the 
worldwide expansion of capitalism and Western rationality, the concept of man as 
humanitas was narrowed down to the modern, Christian, ‘rational’, liberal, 
capitalist. The European male of the Enlightenment, its moral, its religion, its 
knowledge, its history and its institutions, becomes the reference, Eurocentrism par 
excellence (Loomba, 1998:66).  
Gayatri Spivak (1988) used the term epistemic violence to refer to the 
construction of the colonial subject as the other. The violence and domination of 
the colonial and the neocolonial project is supported and legitimated by the 
superiority of Western knowledge. The imposition of a dominant form of 
knowledge denies the validity of any other form of knowledge, dispossessing 
different groups of people of their own worldviews. In this process of designing 
what counts as knowledge and who produces it, Europe becomes the explicative 
subject, whereas the other is turned into an object to be explained (Omar, 2008: 
147). Related to epistemic violence, Spivak (1985) coined the term worlding to 
emphasize the way Western knowledge represents, and constitute the world as if it 
was an empty space, a “mere uninscribed earth, anew, by obliging (…) to 
domesticate the alien as Master” (Spivak, 1985: 253).   To illustrate this, Spivak 
(1988) provides the example of the codification of the Hindu law by British 
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scholars “as an alien legal system masquerading as law as such, an alien ideology 
established as the only truth, and a set of human sciences busy establishing  the 
"native" as self-consolidating other (…)” (Spivak, 1985:250). 
In Peace Studies, Johan Galtung (1990: 291) coined the term cultural 
violence to refer to “those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence - 
exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and 
formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct 
or structural violence”. As Sidi Omar (2008: 146) argues, these concepts cannot be 
used interchangeably since cultural violence focuses on culture in general, and 
epistemic violence entails specific social and historical events and realities. 
In this construction of the other, time plays a key role. Spaces existing 
outside of Europe were organized through the “ideological device of time” 
(Grovogui, 2006: 54). The cultural distance between the West and the colonized 
was measured by historical time. Civilization was the barometer that placed the rest 
on the waiting room of history. Disregarding the spatial dimension, it was assumed 
that humanity had evolved through a single continuum of time starting from 
prehistory that had reached its developmental peak during Western Enlightenment 
and the nineteenth century (Chakrabarty, 2000; Grovogui, 2006; Lander, 2000). 
Anthropologist Johannes Fabian (1983:31) called denial of coevalness, to the 
“persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a 
Time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse.” In other 
words, the anthropologist and the object of its discourse exist in a separate 
historical time. This has had clear political implications in the construction of the 
savage, the primitive, the indigenous, the lowest step in the scale of human 
evolution (Castro-Gómez, 2000). By means of the denial of coevalness modern 
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Europe became the geographical and temporal center (Lander, 2000; Chakrabarty, 
2000; Grovogui, 2006; Fabian, 1983). The reduction of the space to a single 
temporal frame is linked to the idea of progress and, therefore, to scientific 
rationality. The Western modern project, from the watchtower of its central 
position and the authority endowed by scientific rationality, assigned itself the 
mission to ‘liberate’ these “contemporary ancestors” from their own pasts 
(Visvanathan, 1998: 101).   
The colonial order entailed a reconfiguration of knowledges, languages, 
economies and imaginaries. Founded on a particular epistemology, the West 
neglected other conceptions of time, space, sovereignty, and territoriality 
(Grovogui, 2006; Lander, 2000). As Edward Said (1978: 62-63) argues, approaches 
to self and others, and stereotypes about races, cultures and civilizations existed 
before colonization. The enhancement of the difference of these stereotypes, the us/ 
them logic, was not reduced with the objectivity of science, but reinforced and 
reshaped (Loomba, 1998: 57-60). Colonization entailed a simultaneous reordering 
and misrepresentation obeying to the dialectics of materialism and ideology 
(Loomba, 1998: 57, 113). Mary Louise Pratt (1992) as quoted in Loomba (1998: 
61) argues that from the eighteenth-century on, “science came to articulate 
Europe’s contacts with the imperial frontier, and to be articulated by them”. The 
hierarchical classification of people according to race was one of the foundational 
principles of the colonial project. From this “new planetary consciousness” 
(Loomba, 1998:61) which drove Linnaeus to his systematical classification of 
plants, in 1770 J. F. Blumebach engaged in a classificatory project of human beings 
on the basis of their physiological traits. The claimed superiority of white man was 
reaffirmed by his use of the monogenetic theory of the human origin that dates the 
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beginning of man back to the white Caucasian man, considering other races as 
degenerations of this single origin (Young, 1995: 62). Partially due to the assumed 
objectivity and value-free of science, to the identity of the scientists themselves and 
their attachment to the European, and to the lack of access to science of the labeled 
as inferior, the absence of scientific opposition allowed the consolidation and 
naturalization of the racial paradigm (Loomba, 1998: 64). Scientific rigor was left 
aside, in theory and practice, in favor of the political and social agenda (Grovogui, 
2006: 34). According to Anthony Padgen (1993; quoted in Grovogui, 2006: 34), 
“scientists easily stepped outside of reigning scientific norms and wisdom when 
questions of race culture, and civilization implicated the relationship between the 
West and the Rest.” Anne Laura Stoler (2008) argues that colonial agents relied 
more on sentiments and emotional elements, than on science and systematical 
observation. Attachment, resentment, pity, or disdain, were assigned to the 
treatment of specific social groups as part of the classification process. 
Mudimbe (1988:32) distinguishes between two kinds of ethnocentrisms, the 
ideological and the epistemological, both inseparably linked. The ideological refers 
to the intellectual and behavioral attitude of the individual. The epistemological is 
linked to an episteme, understood in the Foucaldian sense, as a set of theory that is 
established as the dominant, setting aside others considered as inferior (Omar, 
2008: 145). In sum, ethnocentrism emerges from the complexity of the interaction 
of the scholar's individual consciousness, the prevailing scientific views, and the 
values and norms of the society. The model of natural sciences plus the imperialist 
ideology shaped the epistemological core of nineteenth-century social sciences 
(Mudimbe, 1988). As had been done with other life forms, human behavior and 
cultures were removed from their environment and “rewoven into European-based 
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patterns of global unity and order” (Pratt, 1992; quoted in Loomba, 1998: 61). 
Disciplines like history, philology, anthropology, linguistics and biology 
contributed to the “reification of the primitive”, and to the epistemological 
superiority of Europe, by assigning “to things and beings both their natural slots 
and social mission” (Mudimbe, 1988: 30). For Mudimbe (1988:32), the conditions 
of possibility of social sciences lie in its intrinsic link to Eurocentrism, considered 
by the author as “both its virtue and its weakness”. 
 Claude Lévi-Strauss (1973; quoted in Mudimbe (1988) thought that through 
the study of cultural diversity it was possible to overcome ideology and refute the 
falsehoods imposed by it. Derrida (1976, in Morton, 2002: 32) criticizes Lévi-
Strauss’s portrayal of South American tribes as romanticized, recreating the noble 
savage stereotype, and ignoring the complexity of their practices. Starting from 
Lévi-Strauss, Derrida extends his critique to Western critical theory’s use of non-
Western societies to illustrate the limits of western knowledge. However, these 
societies are represented as mute, passive, mere objects of Western representation 
without culture or history.  
1.3 Beyond epistemic violence 
Epistemic violence needs to be addressed in two simultaneous ways, the 
revision of the internal plurality of science, and the external plurality of science, the 
relation of science with non-scientific knowledges (Santos, 2007b: 46). 
Social and natural sciences, as part of their constant self-questioning process, 
have overcome old paradigms, theoretical models of scientificity, methodologies, 
and attitudes. The blurring of some protective inner barriers has erased the 
reductionist view of science as a unified single epistemological model. The 
consideration of science as a construction associated with social and cultural 
 31 
 
practices has led to the acceptance of the situatedness and partiality of scientific 
knowledge. The relation of science with power structures of domination and 
exclusion of subjects, with institutions, entities and economic interests has also 
been put into question (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007). 
The debate on the external boundaries of science, the recognition of cultural 
and epistemological diversity, other forms of producing knowledge, has been 
opened up, mostly, by postmodern, feminists and postcolonial thinkers (Santos, 
Nunes and Meneses, 2007; Gorovogui, 2006). 
As it has been shown in the previous section, the colonial military, political, 
social and cultural domination was linked to the epistemological exclusivism of 
science. The legacy of the colonial order and the Eurocentric teleology pervades 
today under different, political, social, and economic forms and relations, and 
therefore, its epistemological supremacy. Instead of civilization, evangelization and 
modernization, Grovogui (2006: 33) argues that, “[t]oday the barometers of reason 
and legitimacy in Western eyes are liberalism, secularism, democracy, rule of law 
on governance, property and human rights.”  
Postmodernism emerges as a contestation of Western rationality from a spirit 
of doubt, disillusionment and disbelief in the modern construction of thought 
(Dietrich and Sützl, 1997: 282-184). It implies a rejection of the big narratives of 
peace, justice, order, equality, eternal truths, and the power structures embedded in 
modernity.  
Postmodernism questions the fixity of identities, and the social construction 
of categories like gender, class, and ethnicity, and all the modern referents leading 
towards emancipation (Grovogui, 2006: 49-52; MacIntosh, 2012); it denies the 
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universalist ideology underlying modernity and the lineal development of history 
expressed through concepts such as progress, modernization, and development.  
Rather than the modern erasure of differences, postmodern thought opens up 
spaces for the production of difference, heterogeneity and plurality, and represents 
an opportunity to a multiplicity of narratives against the centrality of modernity 
(Castro-Gómez, 2000; Chakrabarty. 2000; Quayson, 2000). Postmodern thinking is 
grounded on an anti-essentialist, constructivist epistemology (Santos, 2007a: 45). 
Deconstruction is one of the main theoretical tools employed by postmodern 
thinkers for critical analysis. For Spivak (Morton, 2002: 32, 39), deconstruction has 
ethical and political implications since it allows the intellectual to analyze damage 
caused on the subaltern by political representation.  
However, postmodern thought has been criticized by its excessive focus on 
European modernity. This European standpoint ignores and generalizes other 
modernities, without acknowledgement of the power relations that affected identity 
formation, and the subjectivity of non-European (Grovogui, 2006; Quayson, 2008). 
 The doubt and disillusion that Dietrich and Stülz mentioned are viewed from 
a ‘Third World’ academics as disengagement and remoteness, as a sign of 
“Western malaise which breeds angst and despair instead of aiding political action 
and resistance” (Loomba, 1998: xii). For Santos (2007a: 42), the postmodern 
attempt to rupture with modernity incurs in a basic contradiction since it is 
grounded on the critical tradition embedded in modernity; the trap of solipsism as 
pointed by Raimon Panikkar (2010; quoted in McIntosh, 2012: 44): 
Like modernists, some influential postmodernists get trapped in the 
solipsism - the circular self-referentality - of their own rationality because 
they cannot accept the possibility of ways of knowing that go beyond their 
own ego control and require opening up to the Mythos within which Logos 
itself sits. 
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The postmodern claim of the end of the modern metanarratives is in itself 
another metanarrative (Santos, 2007a). Castro Gomez (2000) warns about the end of 
the metanarratives if it implies that the emergence of the micro-narratives make 
invisible the power relations within the current global capitalist system rather than 
putting an end to it. 
Dussel (2000), as it was covered in the previous section, deconstructs the 
dominant Eurocentric versions of modernity which do not take into account 
colonization. For Dussel, to dismantle the myth of modernity implies to deny its 
innocence, to discover its violence and irrationality. By unveiling the Eurocentric 
dimension and the fallacy of the modernization project it is possible overcome the 
view of the emancipatory reason as liberation and transcend modernity. Dussel 
does not reject reason in itself, but the Eurocentric, hegemonic and irrational 
reason. He calls for a Transmodernity, a subsumed, and redefined modernity as a 
worldwide project of liberation of otherness, “a multiplicity of decolonial critical 
responses to Euro-centered modernity from the subaltern cultures and epistemic 
location of colonized people around the world” (Grosfoguel, 2008:17).  
Walter Mignolo (2002, 2009) focuses on the implications for knowledge 
production of Dussel’s proposal.  Mignolo draws from Aníbal Qujiano’s concept of 
the coloniality of power and knowledge, to which I will briefly discuss before 
proceeding on to examining Mignolo’s view on epistemic Eurocentrism.  
For Quijano (2000), the previously mentioned racial hierarchy that structured 
the power relations of colonialism pervades the current global capitalist world. This 
“element of coloniality” (Quijano, 2000: 533), which places white man at the top of 
the pyramid, serves as the axis that sustains the matrix of power and the current 
Eurocentric  domination in economic, cultural, social, linguistic, spiritual, sexual 
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and epistemic aspects. For Grosfoguel (2008: 7), these aspects are not additive, but 
constitutive of the European modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world−system. 
Departing from Dussel and Quijano, Mignolo (2002, 2009) proposes to think 
from the colonial difference. The colonial difference is characterized by the denial 
of the ability of non-Western societies to produce knowledge on Western terms. It 
is from this colonial disinherited that “An-Other paradigm” can emerge. For him, 
the history of knowledge is determined historically and geographically. Specific 
languages, institutions and geo-histories lie behind the origin of the imperial 
knowledge considered as universal, hence the necessity to question the foundations 
of who produces and controls knowledge. To de-colonize knowledge implies not a 
mere disciplinary or interdisciplinary critical thinking, but a shift of the locus of 
enunciation. It is through the geopolitics of knowledge and epistemic disobedience 
that a “de-linking” from the imperial knowledge and from the matrix of power is 
possible. 
For sociologist Gregor McLennam (2013: 129), rather than theoretical 
arguments, many of Mignolo’s claims are closer to sociology of knowledge. Santos 
(2007a: 53-54) argues that Mignolo’s critique is founded on geographical 
determinism rather than on theoretical contents. A situated knowledge cannot be 
based exclusively on geographical determinism. For Santos, the idea of a total 
rupture as proposed by Mignolo’s An-Other Paradigm is idiosyncratic of Western 
modern reason, which considered itself as the main actor in rejecting and breaking 
with what is labeled as alien. Moreover, to emphasize exteriority instead of 
promoting theoretical bonds and understanding reinforces the modern distinction 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Even the idea of an absolute exteriority from which 
Mignolo departs is put into question when considered dialectically, since the 
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exteriority is subjected to its exclusion from within the system of domination. For 
Santos the focus must be brought into the difference between the oppressor and the 
oppressed, and not into the differences between those contesting oppression. 
Western thought is as indispensable as inadequate to understand and 
transform the world (Chakrabarty, 2000; Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007). It is 
this inadequacy, hidden behind the naturalization imposed by the hegemonic canon 
of modernity that has led to the rigidity of orthopedic thinking and the uncertainties 
of our time. The necessity to open up the canon of knowledge and to establish a 
dialogic relation with other ways of producing knowledge, to learn with and from 
these other ways, is the line of argument in De Sousa Santos thinking which will be 
presented in the next section.  
1.3.1 A Common Construction of Knowledge 
De Sousa Santos thought runs parallel to that of postmodern and post-
colonial scholars, converging and diverging on certain points in their critique of 
modernity, and of the way that colonial logic underlies the current imperialist 
relations. Santos (2011:16) proposal of the Epistemologies of the South starts from 
two premises: The first one is that the cultural diversity of the world, the different 
modes of experiencing, thinking, acting, relating and making sense of it are 
infinite. The second premise is that the understanding of the world surpasses 
Western knowledge. There are many possible ways to live in the world and to 
transform it that are unthinkable and unimaginable for Western thought, hence the 
need for a common construction of knowledge (Santos, 2011:17). However, in 
order to do this, the West has to free itself from the colonial arrogance that has 
made impossible for it to learn from and with others. Western narcissism has led to 
its own stagnation and exhaustion. This does not mean to delink or dismiss certain 
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kind of knowledge but to engage in a dialogue with other forms of producing 
knowledge where the West is placed as a province of the world (Santos, 2009).  
 In Santos’ proposal (2007b), rather than rejecting the concept of social 
emancipation as a political and ethical aspiration because of its Western, modern 
origin, the author proposes a reinvention of it. Although the West hid the relation 
between epistemology, ontology and politics, it is not possible to rethink social 
emancipation without epistemological changes (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: 
xlviii). To that end, the infinitude of experiences, of ways of making sense of the 
world cannot be reduced to any general theory. This is what Santos (2007b: 63) 
calls “negative universalism”, the impossibility to grasp the diversity of the world, 
its processes and changes, from a universal theory. To avoid the monocultural trap 
of universal concepts for social emancipation, and the resulting subordination or 
assimilation to it, Santos posits, the job of translating the different projects of social 
emancipation is needed in order to create intelligibilities between the plurality of 
social groups and movements that with their partial, emancipatory projects, form 
the counter-hegemonic globalization. The work of translation, as it will be 
explained later, “seeks to turn incommensurability into difference, a difference 
enabling mutual intelligibility among the different projects of social emancipation” 
(Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xl). According to De Sousa Santos (2011), the 
fore-mentioned exhaustion of Western thought manifests itself under two forms, 
the lack of alternatives, and the crisis of the Eurocentric critical theory.  
Concerning the lack of alternatives for social emancipation, Santos (2010:35) 
argues that modern remedies cannot transform modern problems. The financial 
crisis we are currently submerged in is just one more symptom of the problems of 
the West. The most worrying concern is the lack of political imagination regarding 
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the capitalist system and its underlying monocultural epistemic foundations. 
Philosopher Mark Fisher (2009) states that today it is easier to imagine the end of 
the world than the end of capitalism. The crisis of imagination has led to an 
ideological blockage reflected in distopic thought like Fisher’s. What socialism 
represented in the 20th century has not a clear equivalent nowadays; post-capitalist 
and post-occidental initiatives emerging in certain contexts are still in embryonic 
stage and have not defined their direction (De Sousa, 2011:13). The current thought 
is more easily expressed in negative terms than in a constructive one, it is easier to 
know what we are against than to define a desired world (Santos, 2011: 9-12). For 
Santos (2007b, 2011:16) what is needed are not alternatives, but an alternative way 
to think about alternatives. Since these are already there. There are other concepts 
of time, other ways to look at the past, the present and the future, to relate to other 
humans, to nature and to the sacred, different forms to organize life collectively, 
and different economies; however, this diversity has been made invisible by the 
hegemonic thought. To activate and visualize these experiences without enclosing 
them in universal general theories is to look for plural ways of constructing 
knowledge. 
The second manifestation, closely related to the first one, is the crisis of the 
Eurocentric critical theory. To be aware of it does not imply to reject it or ignore it, 
but to take distance from it, and get closer to silenced, subaltern positions either 
Western or non-Western (Santos, 2010:37). De Sousa Santos (2011, 2010) 
formulates this argument around four main lines: 
We live in a time of strong questions and weak answers. Strong questions 
address “the roots and foundations that have created the horizon of possibilities 
among which it is possible to choose”, whereas weak answers “are the ones that 
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refuse to question the horizon of possibilities”. The professionalization and 
institutionalization of modern science as the privileged form of knowledge has 
detached itself from basic questions which human beings have asked themselves: 
the meaning of life, the relation to God, to other human and non-human beings, to 
nature, the coexistence within society, or questions about a common future in a 
more just and egalitarian society. This detachment has led to orthopedic thinking 
(Santos, 2009:110). 
Another sign of the crisis lies in the contradiction between the urgency for a 
change, and its consequent demand for quick measures, and the slow pace that a 
long-term deep civilizational change requires, since we are dealing with 
mentalities, values, ways of living and coexisting. For example, this is manifested 
in a number of institutions agencies, summits, and programs to eradicate poverty, 
famine, or to fight global warming (Santos, 2011: 14). 
A third aspect is what De Sousa (2011, 2010), calls the loss of nouns. By that 
he refers to how critical theory limits itself by adding adjectives to overturn the 
meaning of nouns used by liberal thought. Substantives like socialism, class 
struggle, fetishism, alienation, reification were important elements of critical 
theories’ discourse. However, critical theory has lost the nouns in favor of the 
adjectives. Terms like sustainable development, intercultural human rights, radical 
democracy or subaltern cosmopolitanism may serve as examples. Substantives 
frame the terms of the debate and determine what exists, what is sayable, possible, 
and believable, at the same time that determine what is unsayable, impossible and 
unbelievable (Santos, 2010:30).  Nouns have no property, counter-hegemonic 
movements have used and subverted hegemonic instruments for their own 
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purposes, but critical theory should be aware of the limitations that it implies 
(Santos, 2011:15).  
The last symptom of the current situation of Eurocentric critical theory refers 
to the distance between theory and praxis. Santos (2010, 2011) argues that while 
the Eurocentric critical theory emerged in a few European countries, a view shared 
by some post-colonial scholars (Mignolo, 2009; Dussel, 2000), the most innovative 
and progressive advances are taking place far away from these countries, and are 
being carried out by actors and social movements different from the alternatives 
foreseen by critical theorists; women, queer, indigenous people, unemployed, 
peasants, the distance is not only geographical and contextual but also 
epistemological. Much of these groups and movements forms of knowledge, and 
existence were not based on the scientism of the Western theories (De Sousa, 2010: 
33). 
The Epistemologies of the South is a call for other practices, ideas, 
experiences and forms of knowledge that have been silenced, discarded, 
marginalized and turned into nonexistent. These knowledges come from groups of 
people that have been systematically oppressed by capitalism, colonialism and 
patriarchy, which have been deprived from experiencing the world on their own 
terms because they do not fit in the hegemonic paradigms of orthopedic thinking 
(Santos, 2009, 2010, 2011). It is a call to re-think and re-imagine another future, 
and a call to re-place modern science, and Europe, in a world of infinite 
particularisms (Goody, 2007; Santos, 2009). In sum, the aim is to establish new 
relations between different kinds of knowledges, scientific and non-scientific, 
where the premises of these dialogues are not pre-conditioned by the West (Santos, 
2010, 2011). 
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Before continuing, it may be needed to specify the term South on Santos 
approach, since it can be interpreted in multiple ways. The South and its relational 
pair, the North may run the risk of recreating the discourse of the West and the Rest 
(Hall, 1992), of two monolithic entities, constructed unidirectionally, and binary 
opposed, where difference is used to legitimate inequalities. The South for Santos 
is not the geographical south as in Raewyn Connell’s (2007) approach. In De Sousa 
Santos proposal (2011: 16), the South is not understood geographically, but in a 
metaphorical way. It is a metaphor of the inequality, the suffering and the injustice 
caused by the fore-mentioned hegemonic structures. The South is anti-imperialist, 
anti-capitalist, and anti-colonialist. As John and Jean Comaroff (2012) also point, 
there are no clear boundaries between the North and the South, the limits are 
porous and illegible, there is South in the North, and there is North in the South 
(Comaroff, 2012; Santos, 2010, 2011). A sense of commonality, as opposed to 
division, of the problems confronting human condition, is implied in this nuance. 
There are, and have been, social groups, movements and thinkers in the North that 
have been excluded “because they did not conform to the imperialist and 
Orientalist objectives prevailing after the convergence of modernity and 
capitalism” (De Sousa, 2009:106). It is the claim “for the exclusivity of the rigor” 
of Northern epistemologies, and the resulting cognitive injustice, that brings about 
the need for the Epistemologies of the South (Santos, 2011: 16).  
In order to identify and recover these experiences of the world constructed as 
non-existing, De Sousa (2009, 2010, 2011) proposes two empirical processes, a 
sociology of absences and a sociology of emergences. 
As it was stated in the previous section, the colonial order established an 
“abyssal line” (Santos, 2010, 2007c) to separate the metropolis from the colonies, 
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agreements and rights were applied on one side of the line separating the included 
from the excluded on the basis of the legitimacy of the universal.  The sociology of 
absences seeks an expansion of the present by making visible what has been made 
invisible (Santos, 2011: 5); it points to show that what has been constructed as non-
existent, has actively been constructed as non-existent. The author distinguishes 
five modes of Eurocentric absence construction: the ignorant, the backward, the 
inferior, the local, and the unproductive; resulting respectively from the 
monocultures of knowledge, of lineal time, of the naturalization of difference, of 
the dominant scale, and of the capitalist criteria of productivity (Santos, 2010: 37).  
The sociology of emergences consists in a look into the future through the 
practices that are taking place in the present. To explain this, De Sousa Santos 
(2010:41) draws from Ernst Bloch (1986) the concept of “Not-Yet” in his critique 
of the stillness, that, according to Bloch, characterizes Western thought. The Not-
Yet is a ““forward dawning and pre-appearance (…) Every age contains its 
horizon, its Front over which this Not-Yet-Conscious flows when the block of 
static and regressive thinking is lifted” (Bloch, 1986: xxix). Thus, the sociology of 
emergences attempts to extend “this Front by venturing beyond, by inventing, 
visualizing the possibilities of the world that is coming over the threshold” (Bloch, 
1995: xxix). The Not-Yet is the future hinted at by the concrete possibilities and 
capacities of the present. Therefore, the sociology of emergences acts upon the 
horizon of possibilities, knowledges, practices, and agents of the present, in order 
to increase the probability of hope (Santos, 2010: 41). 
The ecology of knowledge and the intercultural translation are the two 
procedures by means of which the aforementioned horizon of capabilities and 
possibilities will be expanded. (Santos, 2011: 18). 
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The ecology of knowledges is “an invitation to the promotion of non-
relativistic dialogues among knowledges, granting ‘equality of opportunities’ to the 
different kinds of knowledge” (Santos, Nunes and Menses, 2007: xx). It re-places 
the monoculture of science within the polyculture of knowledges as a step towards 
the reinvention of social emancipation. It implies a decolonizing and democratizing 
move that takes knowledge regarded as regulation, to knowledge regarded as 
emancipation (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: li):  
Knowledge-as-regulation knows through a trajectory that goes from 
ignorance, regarded as disorder, to knowledge described as order, while 
knowledge as emancipation knows through a trajectory that goes from 
ignorance, conceived of as colonialism, to knowledge conceived of as 
solidarity. 
The principle that sustains the dialogue is that any form of knowledge is not 
complete, autonomous or self-sufficient in itself. Therefore, “[a]ll ignorance is 
ignorant of a certain knowledge, and all knowledge is the overcoming of a 
particular ignorance” (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xlvii). The idea of 
prudence and humility underlies this principle, the recognition that there is more 
than one form of knowledge, and therefore, of ignorance, in the way human beings 
relate to each other and with nature, and that to learn from others does not imply to 
reject your own knowledge (Santos, 2010: 44). 
The aim of the ecology of knowledges is not to give equal validity to all 
knowledges, but to look for “a pragmatic discussion of alternative criteria of 
validity” (Santos, 2007a: xlix). After rejecting universalism, Santos’ proposal 
ensures to avoid the trap of relativism. The criteria of validity are not the pre-
established epistemological hierarchy of modern science, but a contextual, 
pragmatic hierarchy, that is, depending on the specific case and purpose (Santos, 
2007a: xlix). 
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The intercultural translation is the methodological and political procedure to 
promote symmetric dialogues in order to create reciprocal intelligibilities between 
the available and the possible experiences of the world (Santos, 2010: 46).  As was 
mentioned earlier, the aim of the intercultural translation is to turn 
incommensurability into difference, and from difference, create intelligibilities that 
enable cross-cultural communication (Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007: xl). The 
intercultural translation entails the relations between different cultures, 
knowledges, practices and cosmologies, and different social movements, their 
actors and their practices. It identifies isomorphic concerns between cultures and 
their responses to them. The relation of these knowledges and practices with the 
hegemonic forms has to be taken into account. The task of translation is twofold. 
On one side, a deconstructive one, since it must be considered that these 
knowledges have undergone different processes of oppression, and they have 
responded and resisted in different ways. On the other side, a reconstructive, non-
regressive job of going beyond these Eurocentric remnants is needed in order to 
revitalize their historic and cultural possibilities (Santos, 2010:46). 
According to Santos (2010:46), the intercultural translation of knowledges 
takes the form of a diatopical hermeneutics, in order to identify their concerns and 
their responses. The term diatopical hermeneutics was coined by Raimon Panikkar 
(1999) to refer to the promotion of the dialogue between cultures that do not have 
direct links or historical contact. For Panikkar (1999:27), in order to reach mutual 
intelligibilities, it is needed to overcome not only the spatial and temporal 
distances, but also the cultural topoi, that is, the self-evident and naturalized 
cultural premises on which each culture is founded. Therefore, Panikkar (1999:27) 
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asserts, “before anything else we have to forge the tools of understanding in the 
encounter itself, for we cannot –should not– assume a priori a common language.” 
 As it has been mentioned earlier, Santos (2007: 48) starts from the basis that 
every knowledge, culture, or experience of the world is incomplete, that they are 
partial totalities, and they have lacks. Thus, they can be enriched by means of the 
dialogue with others. However, the tendency is to see one’s experience, culture or 
knowledge as a totality, a homogenous whole. As Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999: 30) 
states, 
The concept of totality assumes the possibility and the desirability of being 
able to include absolutely all known knowledge into a coherent whole. In 
order for this to happen, classification systems, rules of practice and 
methods had to be developed to allow for knowledge to be selected and 
included in what counts as history.  
The role of the diatopical hermeneutics is to raise awareness of the 
incompleteness, and to take it to its maximum point through a dialogue where one 
keeps an eye on its own experience, and the other eye on the other experience. This 
relativity of cultures and knowledges must not be confused with a relativist or 
universalist position, since both consider difference as an insurmountable obstacle 
and reject the possibility of relation and dialogue (Santos, 2010:65). In contrast, 
cultural relativity implies the aforementioned incompleteness; it “(…) means that 
every worldview and every assertion are relative to its contexts. Nobody has a 
complete and absolute view of reality (…)” (Esteva, 2011: 575).  
In sum, rather than transference of equivalents from a cosmovision to 
another, the intercultural translation is a procedure for a collective construction of 
knowledge through the identification of common concerns, commonalities between 
different forms of resistant initiatives and experiences working towards the 
recognition, redistribution and reconfiguration of knowledges (Santos, Nunes and 
Meneses, 2007). Rather than difference as inequality, or as an obstacle, in the 
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meshwork of knowledges that attempts the proposal of the Epistemologies of the 
South, difference is considered as a relational space to be inhabited. It is in this 
space of encounters, where tensions, complementarities, interdependencies and 
clashes take place, where a better understanding of the self and the other may 
flourish. 
1.4 Peaces 
Within peace studies, from the University of Innsbruck, Wolfgang Dietrich 
and Wolfgang Sutzl (1997), talk of “many peaces”, in plural, and situate current 
peace research within postmodern. The modern understanding based on the eternal 
truths of security, justice, development and reason took shape in a standardized and 
mechanistic view of peace. The resulting disillusion and disbelief with modern 
thinking opened the door to difference and to a plurality of understandings of 
peace, linked in turn to a plural understanding of the world beyond the universal 
aspirations of modern thought. Dietrich’s proposal to twist modernity and 
postmodernity, Transrational Peaces, will be covered in the next chapter. 
Vicent Martínez Guzmán (2001) from the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for 
Peace, uses the plural form of peace, peaces, to include the different possibilities to 
make peace. 
Martínez Guzmán (2001: 15) situates his proposal as Trans-modern, Trans-
Kantian, framed within a Western social cosmology. He (2001:16) asserts the 
resolution of the discipline to renounce to the Western ethnocentric pride and to 
turn it into responsibility and commitment with the excluded by the universalism of 
European rationality.  
Martínez Guzmán (2001:76) outlines the role of Western white, male science 
and instrumental reason in imposing a particular worldview and a form of 
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producing knowledge in the conflation of modern science with colonialism. The 
author (2001:76) emphasizes the critical function of Philosophy (for Peace) and its 
commitment with human values. Thus, the author’s critique modern and positivist 
science based on the notions of objectivity and neutrality is a central point in his 
proposal. Martínez Guzmán (2001:112) proposes to shift the initial epistemological 
foundation of Peace Studies conceived as how far or how close it is from the model 
of natural sciences, to a broader concept of Epistemology, understood as the study 
of the multiple and diverse human competences to make peace(s), transform 
conflicts, undo violence, and to leave in peace. 
The resulting Epistemological Turn allows disciplines and fields whose 
scientificity had been denied, the recognition as science. The new paradigm 
consists of fifteen tenets, however I will only cover the most relevant for this 
chapter. Rather than objectivity, it emphasizes the intersubjective character of 
science. The relation between subject and object turns into a relation between 
subjects, persons, therefore, with the right to interlocution. The concept of nature as 
a distant object to be dominated is to be replaced by resituating the human being as 
an integral part of it. To overcome unilateral reasoning, the focus will be put on 
reasons, emotions, sentiments, tenderness and care (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 114-
116).  
The Epistemological Turn could be framed within the internal plurality of 
science. Its relation with other forms of knowledge and existence is mentioned 
through the commitment to reconstruct “vernacular knowledges”1 (Martínez 
Guzmán, 2001: 105).  In his call for an interdisciplinary and intercultural approach 
to search for peaceful ways to transform human relations and with nature, the 
                                                          
1
 “saberes vernaculares” (own translation) 
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author warns against the dangers of imposing one form of knowledge over the 
others The author highlights the need for an intercultural perspective that goes 
beyond the mere acknowledgement of plurality, and that submits peace research to 
a “richness of tensions and nuances (…)” (Martínez Guzmán 2009: 24). At the 
same time, he warns against the ethnocentrism resulting from the assimilation of 
human diversity within Western assumptions (Martínez Guzmán, 2001:25). The 
author plays a central importance to dialogue for intercultural understanding. It is 
through this dialogue “with other cultures that we can learn to unlearn what we 
have forgotten along the way by not paying attention to the knowledges of the 
others, and to be critical with our own proposals (…)”1 (Martínez Guzmán, 2001: 
108; italics in the original). 
Conclusions  
According to the authors covered in last section, peace studies has opened the 
door to different understandings of the world, and to other ways of making 
peace(s). Nevertheless, interculturality, as Martínez Guzmán warned above about 
the risks of assimilation, poses a challenge to Academia in general (McIntosh, 
2012) and to a field linked to a European tradition.  
As it has been briefly mentioned in this chapter, indigenous ways of 
conceiving existence and producing knowledge do not fit the Cartesian ontological 
model. Their connection of mind and body implies no separation between 
knowledge and being in the world, practice and experience, where spirituality is 
enmeshed in everyday practice. These forms of  being in the world can shed light 
into “deeper strata of reality that might permit us to go to the roots of our 
problems” (Panikkar, 1979; in Esteva, 2011: 581), by  bringing Western thought 
                                                          
1
 “(…) con otras culturas donde aprendemos a desaprender lo que hemos olvidado en el camino por no 
estar atentos a los saberes de las otras y los otros, y a ser críticos con nuestros planteamientos (…) (own 
translation) 
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into contention if the West decides to examine its thought in light of non-Western 
instead of the other way round. 
If we take further the metaphor of the open doors, the necessary expansion of 
the inner boundaries of science as proposed by Philosophy for Peace might still 
find peace studies inside the comfort zone of the house waiting to welcome these 
previously excluded voices to have a conversation in our own terms. Hospitality is 
a must, but it might be necessary to go out to the forest presented in the 
introduction, the forest we are a part of, and consider the variety of struggles that 
creatively combine or resist against the monocultures imposed by the colonial, 
imperialist and the global capitalist logic. To frame these other voices in peace 
terms may imply to fall in the trap of orthopedic thinking. The statement of Raimon 
Panikkar above in this chapter might be a starting point to build these necessary 
bridges for “existential, intimate and concrete” (Panikkar 2000; quoted in Esteva, 
2011: 573) dialogue.  
Next chapter gets into that forest by analyzing four cases of how 
interculturality has been dealt in peace studies. 
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Chapter II 
Diversity in Peace 
“You try to draw everything into the net of your faith, father, but you 
can't steal all the virtues. Gentleness isn't Christian, self-sacrifice isn't 
Christian, charity isn't, remorse isn't. I expect the caveman wept to see 
another's tears. Haven't you even seen a dog weep? In the last cooling of the 
world, when the emptiness of your belief is finally exposed, there'll always be 
some bemused fool who'll cover another's body with his own to give it 
warmth for an hour more of life.” 
(Graham Greene, 1961: 67-68) 
Introduction 
Taking Martínez Guzmán’s proposal to expand the epistemological limits of 
current peace research and recognition of the plurality of peace into consideration,  
this chapter analyzes how human diversity has been dealt within peace studies, and 
whether cultural recognition corresponds with epistemological and ontological 
recognition. In sum, the aim is to look at the relation of peace studies with other 
ways of producing knowledge and conceiving existence. 
  The main conceptual tool for the analysis will be what has been called 
categorical violence drawing from the work of James Scott (1998). The author 
refers by this to the procedures by which the modern state facilitates its functions 
and increases its capacity by engaging in processes of simplification to make the 
complexity of society and nature legible and more convenient for its administrative 
functions. Among these measures the author includes the design of cities, nature, 
and transportation systems, establishing homogeneous units of measure and 
weights, creation of permanent last names and population registers, the 
standardization of language, land tenure systems. This inventory of society and 
nature simplified reality to the parts that were of interest for the state’s purposes, 
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making it more legible, easier to measure, and manipulate; for these measures 
provided not only descriptions, but together with the state power they enabled to 
remap and remake the depicted reality. According to Scott, the project to make 
societies legible is carried out through processes of simplification that require a 
narrowing of vision, to slice reality so that the observer can focus on those aspects 
that interest him/her. The first step in this simplification process to make legible the 
complex and diverse practices, processes, relations, “the infinite array of details” 
(Scott, 1998:77) of a social landscape is to create a common unit of measure.  
Thereon, to create labels, classifications and categories according to the unit of 
measure is a consequent step in order to facilitate “summary descriptions, 
comparisons, and aggregation (Scott, 1998: 77). In that sense, Santos (2003: 225)
1
 
states that “maps distort reality to introduce orientation”. Scott (1998: 7) posits that 
this argument could be transposed to certain kinds of reductive social science. 
Therefore, the concept of categorical violence will be complemented with the 
critique of modern science presented in the first chapter. 
This chapter is organized thusly: 
The first section analyzes the works of Wolfgang Dietrich “Interpretations of 
Peace in History and Culture” (2012) and “Elicitive Conflict Transformation and 
the Transrational Shift in Peace Politics” (2013).  In both cases the focus will be 
put on how the author draws on different traditions to sustain his theoretical 
proposals. The five ‘families of peace’ and his depiction of shamanism as conflict 
transformation will be analyzed. 
The second section presents briefly Johan Galtung’s view of the 
epistemological character of peace studies. Then, it moves to analyze mainly his 
                                                          
1
 “Los mapas distorsionan la realidad para instituir la orientación” (my own translation). 
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hermeneutical exercise of the concept of peace carried out in the article “Social 
Cosmology and the Concept of Peace” (1981). Other works like “Peace and 
Buddhism” (1985) and “Peace by Peaceful Means” (1996) will be commented. The 
work of Peter Lawler (1995) on Johan Galtung and his critique of Galtung’s 
civilization theory will play a center role in this section. 
The third section analyzes Douglas P. Fry calls for an objective. Thereon his 
ethnographic portray of peace in La Paz, a Zapotec community, presented in his 
article “Multiple Paths to Peace: The “La Paz” Zapotec of Mexico” will be then 
analyzed. So it will be his exploration of peace among hunter gatherers as proposed 
in his work “War, Peace and Human Nature” (2013).  
The fourth section covers the work of the organization, Peaceful Societies 
presented on the website, www.peacefulsocieties.org. The concept of peaceful 
societies will be examined. Then, the analysis will focus on an entry of the 
“Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies”, the methodology based on ethnographic 
research, and concretely the description of Semai people will be examined. 
2.1 Transrational Peaces 
Wolfgang Dietrich’s introduced the transrational peaces approach in his book 
“Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture” (2012). The author departs from 
the “many peaces” (Dietrich and Sützl, 1997) introduced in the previous chapter, 
which try to avoid the violence of “the singular, strong and perpetual concept of 
peace (…)” (Dietrich, 2012: 2). Therefore the author draws from different times 
and cultures to organize the multiplicity of peaces, into five categories: energetic, 
moral, modern, postmodern and transrational peaces. The aim is to call “for an 
inquiry into the deeper meaning of the different perceptions of peace” (Dietrich, 
2012: 8) by looking at “their narratives’ peace philosophical level on a general 
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level and to show the practical consequences deriving from them” (Dietrich, 
2012:12). Methodologically, the author asserts the scientificity of his work 
(Dietrich, 2012: 10) mainly based on inductive reasoning.  
If peace will be considered in this chapter as the unit by which cultures, 
traditions and societies will be measured and standardized, in this particular 
section, the above mentioned five  types or understandings of peace  proposed by 
the author constitute the categories in which reality will be schematized. 
Energetic peaces are described by Dietrich (2012: 53-65) as those based on 
the harmonious relation between nature, cosmos and society. They do not emerge 
from an  creator God or an absolute truth, but from the self, from the perception of 
human existence “as embedded in the All-Oneness of all being and assume 
connectivity of all with all (…), peace to them means the mutual harmony of 
perceptible phenomena” (Dietrich, 2012: 273). To illustrate this, the author draws 
on his interpretations of concepts like wu wei, hao ping, dharma, shanti and 
ahimsa, being Taoist thought the epitome of energetic peaces. The author states 
that development, modernization and progress dissolved the awareness of energetic 
concepts (Dietrich, 2012: 53), although these are to be found in all times and 
societies. Notwithstanding, the bulk of the samples derive from translations of what 
the he calls “(…) Eastern wisdom into the enlightened scientific language of the so-
called West” (Dietrich, 2012: 12).  
For moral concepts of peace the energy lies on an external, creator God. 
Moral peaces are based on an absolute norm, laws and codes, peace is a pact “that 
legitimizes itself through its sheer existence and social power (…)” (Dietrich, 
2012: 112). Peace is understood as related to justice. If energetic peaces are 
expressed in the unification of opposites, exemplified in the Ying/Yang, the reliance 
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on an ultimate truth of moral images of peace implies the need for a dualistic 
thinking that distinguishes true/false, good/bad. Examples of moral peaces can be 
found in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism 
and Confucianism (Dietrich, 2012: 65-112).  
Paraphrasing Ramachandra Guha (1989: 97), to categorize these cultures, 
religions and traditions under the label of energetic or moral, appropriating, 
fragmenting and reducing them into peace in a very selective reading responds to 
the desire of presenting peace as an universal concern, and to the need to construct 
a well-founded lineage of the discipline. Guha (1989: 98) posits that this 
appropriation denies agency and reason and turns other cultures into raw material, a 
vehicle for Western projections, independently of the intention of the researcher. 
From the tension between moral and energetic concepts emerge the next 
three families (Dietrich, 2012: 9). Modern concepts of peace rise from a rupture 
with the holistic and organic worldviews of the previous categories to a 
mechanistic one, where God is replaced by reason to explain and manipulate the 
universe. This is reflected in the belief in reason –manifested in the form of 
science, art, political and social theory, or law– as a universal vehicle to create 
norms that regulate society and implement peace. The author illustrates the 
variations of modern peaces in the divergences between Kant, Marx, Hobbes and 
Rousseau’s thought, guided by the principles of hope, expectation, fear and doubt 
respectively (Dietrich, 2012: 145-160).  
As Dietrich points out, modernity is a contested and difficult to define term. 
Here, the Eurocentric character manifests itself by oblivion rather than by 
appropriation. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, Dietrich’s definition of 
modernity is based exclusively on intra-European events and authors, without 
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considering the multiple modernities that emerge from the distinct interactions, and 
also omitting colonialism as a constitutive element of modernity (Dussel, 2000). 
This implies ignoring that the reason-based regulatory and emancipatory norms 
applied in the metropolis took the form of violence in the colonies (Dussel, 2000; 
Santos, Nunes and Meneses, 2007).  
Postmodern peaces emerge from the doubt of the truth of modernity, 
proposing an incomplete twist from moral and modern concepts of peace by means 
of the same modern tool, reason. Postmodern peaces unite rationality with 
relationality (Dietrich, 2012: 274). Peace is relational, contextual and vernacular. 
Multiplicity is the key concept, therefore peace has to be thought in plural, “(…) 
multiform and in need of definition within each context” (Dietrich, 2012: 274). 
While I agree in the inherent violence of a singular, universal, uniform 
concept of peace stated by the author, it could be asked whether the “plurality, 
small, weak, flexible and relational” (Dietrich, 2012: 271) postmodern peaces do 
maintain this form of violence. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, 
Martínez Guzmán warned against the risk of assimilation that these open doors 
could entail. Peace(s) is still a universal concept according to which other forms of 
knowing, existing and organizing will be measured, classified, given meaning and 
validity.  
For Dietrich, this four categories lead into the fifth one, transrational peaces. 
If the twisting of modern and moral peaces was incomplete since postmodern 
proposals were based on the same rational tools, transrational peaces attempts to 
go beyond this limitation by incorporating elements from energetic and moral 
peaces to the modern and postmodern, embracing them all; Harmony, Truth, 
Justice and Security are the components of transrational peaces which aims to 
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integrate the plural, the relational and the spiritual with the rational in search of a 
dynamic equilibrium (Dietrich, 2012: 266). As Dietrich (2012: 257) states “The 
interaction of the individual aspects beyond the exterior and beyond rationality is 
the topic of transrational peace research”. To support this argument, Dietrich draws 
on transpersonal psychology, systems theory, physics, Buddhism, yoga, Hinduism 
and Sufism (Dietrich, 2012: 211- 269). 
The Eurocentric and reductionist character of the transrational peaces 
theoretical framework manifests itself in the assumption that there is only one 
rationality, and it belongs exclusively to Western ideas. Other forms of conceiving 
the world are labelled as energetic, spiritual, relational, harmonious, moral, holistic 
or organic, when indeed are parts of other rationalities if not reduced into peace(s). 
Paraphrasing Scott (1998:21), to isolate a single element of instrumental value, in 
this case, peace, risks to dismember a set of complex and poorly understood set of 
relations and processes.  
As it was argued in the first chapter, the reification of modern Western 
rationality was part of a series of political cultural and economic processes that 
situated, as in this case, the white male at “the hubris of the zero point”, explaining, 
ordering, classifying the world, and denying rationality to other ontologies and 
epistemologies.  
What Santos (2004) calls “metonymic reason”, the one which takes the part 
for the whole, suits the case of transrational peaces. For the author, metonymic 
reason is that which “claims to be the only form of rationality and therefore does 
not exert itself to discover other kinds of rationality, or, if it does, it only does so to 
turn them into raw material” (Santos, 2004: 162). Metonymic reason has a lazy and 
arrogant character. Arrogant because it does not valorize other experiences, and 
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does not find the need to confront itself with other rationalities through dialogue. It 
has a lazy character too, since it imposes a particular experience as a universal one. 
Rather than expanding the world, this leads to the shrinking of the present, 
silencing those subjected to metonymic reason, and concealing existent ways of 
thinking, producing, living, acting and knowing, with the consequent 
impoverishment of reality and the waste of human experience (Aguiló, 2010; 
Santos, 2004).  
On his latest work, “Elicitive Conflict Transformation and the Transrational 
Shift in Peace Politics” (Dietrich, 2013), the author elaborates on elicitive conflict 
transformation as the practical application of the transrational peaces philosophy.  
Elicitive conflict transformation, a term coined and developed by John Paul 
Lederach, moves away from prescriptive approaches toward a systemic view of 
conflict that understands the mediator as a part of it, and draws from local 
knowledges and practices of the participants in order to construct changes in the 
relationships. Dietrich finds the communicative and psychological methods that 
elicitive conflict transformation requires to be in line with the interpersonal and 
intrapersonal orientation of the transrational peaces theoretical framework 
(Dietrich, 2013: 1-24). Thereafter the author collects, combines and interprets 
different methods of elicitive conflict transformation drawing from human and 
transpersonal psychology, systems theory, Western philosophy, and non-European 
practices as diverse as shamanism, budo, aikido or vipassana, revealing “interesting 
interrelations and similarities across disciplinary and cultural boundaries” 
(Dietrich, 2013: 225).I will focus my analysis on the reductionist character of the 
authors’ description of shamanism (Dietrich, 46-54).  
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Shamanism falls in the category of breath-oriented approaches to elicitive 
conflict transformation. The author outlines the importance of breath for a 
relational understanding of conflict, and situates shamanistic breath techniques as 
an important component of transpersonal psychology and consequently of 
transrational peaces. The author argues concerning these techniques that their 
“[s]hamanistic roots are often invisible”, therefore his concern is to make them 
visible in order to facilitate the understanding of other methods (Dietrich, 2013: 
15). 
According to Dietrich (2013: 45), shamans exemplifies the peace and conflict 
worker par excellence. In non-European societies, shamanistic techniques to 
modify consciousness “represent institutionalized forms of healing, self-
exploration, and consciousness expansion” (Dietrich, 2013: 45). For the author, 
shamans belong to the energetic worldview described above since they work within 
the relation between “nature, society and the supernature” (Dietrich, 2013: 47). 
That makes them function as mediators between this world and the Otherworld 
through rituals that deal with life, death, fertility, illness and social relations. The 
therapeutic role and character of healing rituals –not understood as strict medicine 
in the European sense– leads to the practice of elicitive conflict transformation, 
therefore being suitable practices for peace work.  
The author illustrates this with the medicine wheel employed by the Twisted 
Hairs “symbolizing the philosophy, thinking, spirituality, and life of North 
American indigenous peoples (…)” (Dietrich, 2013: 50). For this group, solutions 
to conflict emerge from inner transformation. The author argues that the circle 
shape of the medicine wheel symbolizes the cyclical nature of all beings and the 
knowledge and orientation for action derived from it.  Dietrich outlines the healing 
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effect of the medicine wheel by its intrapersonal focus, and the unification of 
dualities, “the relationship between chaos and harmony in the development of a 
person” (Dietrich, 2013: 51), translates itself in balanced relations with oneself, 
others, and the Universe. This method was adopted by psychotherapy, and it 
underlies elicitive conflict transformation. Another form of dealing with conflict 
based on the medicine wheel, Dietrich accounts, is the circle of law, which fosters 
community participation in decision making process concerning political, social 
and spiritual aspects. It allows governing and transforming conflicts without having 
a normative character. Another shamanistic healing ritual based on the medicine 
wheel accounted by the author is the sweat lodge, by which a community carries 
out a cleansing practice of social, psychological and spiritual transformation. 
(Dietrich, 2013: 46-54). 
Dietrich acknowledges that shamanism cannot be limited to breath-oriented 
methods, being this one of the many shamanistic tools employed for conflict 
transformation. (Dietrich, 2013: 46). The same logic could be applied to the strict 
association of the shaman to peace work or elicitive conflict transformation.  
Scott (1998: 81) argues that the fore-mentioned simplifications product of the 
process of legibility have a twofold meaning. First, they must provide a synoptic 
view of the ensemble, thereby “facts must lose their particularity and reappear in 
schematic or simplified form as a member of a class of facts” (Scott, 1998: 81); 
second, and related to the first, this grouping of facts “entails collapsing or ignoring 
distinctions that might otherwise be relevant” (Scott, 1998: 81). The author (Scott, 
1998: 13-14) posits that it is through this narrowing vision that it is possible to 
impose one’s logic on the observed reality. To look at shamanism through the lens 
of peace follows this simplifying process that makes legible the diversity of 
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contexts, functions, relations, ways of knowledge and of perceiving existence, and 
enables to impose the researcher’s vision on them. 
In the case of the so-called shamanism –a category questioned by Clifford 
Geertz (1966; as quoted in Hultkrantz, 1998: 163) for “dissolving the individuality 
of religious traditions”– besides dealing with social imbalances and conflicts, it 
cannot be overlooked that the functions of the shaman, their rituals and practices, 
are multiple. The shaman’s dealing with the magical, the religious, and the myth 
works as a dynamic factor in cultural processes, changes and adaptations. It 
validates and confirms specific cosmologies. Besides the religious aspect, an 
intellectual and genealogical role is played since the shaman works as the store of 
knowledge, and the memory of the community. They serve as timekeepers and 
masters of the calendar. Shamanistic practices are ecologically significant; shamans 
mediate with animals to assure enough hunting. They employ methods to heal 
diseases, their causes and augur future. They function as a guide for the souls of the 
death. The shaman is endowed with economic, social and political influence and 
authority in the community (Ripinsky-Naxon, 1993: 9, 62-65). 
These and other functions cannot be extracted from specific contexts, 
epistemologies and ontologies. For Viveiros de Castro (2010: 40-41; 2005: 42), 
from the Amerindian multinaturalist and perspectivist stance, the former stated in 
the previous chapter, shamanism is a form of acting that implies a form of 
knowing. The author argues that for modern science to know is to objectify, to 
distinguish what is intrinsic to the object from what it has been projected on him by 
the subject, whereas for the shaman to know means to personify, to take the point 
of view of who is needed to be known, who instead of what because according to 
their concept of personhood the Other is a subject and a person. For the author, the 
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shaman unveils the inner human form hidden under the disguise of every species. 
Perspectivism is the conception “according to which the world is inhabited by 
different sorts of subjects or persons, human or non-human, which apprehend 
reality from distinct points of view” (Viveiros de Castro, 1998; as quoted in Ingold, 
2000: 424). As Ingold summises:  
 Thus to be a person is to assume a particular subject-position, and every 
person, respectively in their own sphere, will perceive the world in the 
same way – in the way that persons generally do. But what they see will 
be different, depending on the form of life they have taken up (Ingold, 
2000: 424). 
Therefore, in this context, the concepts of personhood, the individual, nature, 
society, supernature, reality, what is social, or political, differ from the objectivist 
view that Dietrich’s inscribes onto the shaman. For perspectivism, “there are no 
points of view on things – things and beings are points of view”. Therefore it deals not 
with “how monkeys see the world but what sort of a world is described through 
monkeys, what is the world of which they are the point of view” (Viveiros de Castro, 
2005: 57; italics in the original).  
The author (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 54; 2005: 53) outlines the difference 
between cultural relativism and the Amerindian perspectivist ontology, arguing that 
the former offers diverse subjective representations of an objective and external 
nature, whereas the latter is not a representation but a perspective, that implies a 
representational unit, the soul, and a diversity of external and objective worlds. One 
culture, and multiple natures. The representation is a property of the mind or spirit, 
while the point of view is located in the body not separated from the mind. 
The shaman from this epistemological and ontological stance could be 
defined as  
the manifest aptitude of certain individuals to deliberately cross 
bodily boundaries and adopt the perspective of alo-specific 
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subjectivities so as to manage the relations between these beings and 
humans. Seeing non-human beings as these see themselves (as 
humans), shamans are capable of playing the role of active 
interlocutors in transspecific dialogues. (Viveiros de Castro, 2005: 
42). 
Dietrich (2013: 48) states that his reading of shamanism does not attempt at 
romanticizing practices of forgotten people, but the importance of it lies in the 
universal capability of “being present, discovering our personal center, the heart of 
our personality”. However, a romanticized stance of the shamans’ worldviews, 
rituals and functions pervades in his selective reading which projects onto this 
instrumental shaman the researcher’s personal concerns. This is probably as a 
consequence of the recognized influence on the author (Dietrich, 2013: 47-48) of 
the so-called core-shamanism and neo-shamanism schools, revivalist adaptations of 
shamanism healing techniques to the West initiated by anthropologist Michael 
Harner.  
These schools constructed a Western imaginary of shamanism as a universal 
spiritual tradition that stresses the interconnectedness of all beings, re-connects 
human beings to nature, overcomes dualities, accesses a spiritual reality through 
altered states of consciousness, and focuses on individual inner healing and self-
transformation/ help. Neo-shamanism and core-shamanism were presented in the 
1960’s and 1970’s as an alternative to a certain public disenchanted with 
consumerism, urban, modern life, the Judeo-Christian tradition, and Cartesian 
dualism (Morris, 2006). This view, already overcome by anthropology, has 
received criticisms that are in tune with the aims of this chapter, namely, 
misappropriating and romanticizing indigenous knowledge, reification of cultural 
primitivism, decontextualization and universalization, and an excessive focus on 
the individual and the psychological (Wallis, 2003: 43).  
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In sum, as in the case of the five categories of peace, to assimilate shamanism 
to peace work and elicitive conflict transformation by means of a selective reading 
that looks at it through a peace lens obeys to the "cannibalistic western logic that 
readily constructs other cultural possibilities as resources for western needs and 
actions" (Donna Haraway, 1989; as quoted in Lohman, 1993). Paraphrasing 
Chakrabarty (2000: 29), shamanism, aikido, budo and vipassana flesh out a 
theoretical skeleton that is substantially Europe, the producer of theoria. The 
consequence of this Eurocentric stance, as it has been exposed in the previous 
chapter and it will be extended along this one, is the maintenance of the imperialist 
relation of epistemological domination which leads to the sedimentation of other 
forms of conceiving knowledge and existence under, in this case, the transrational 
peace or the elicitive conflict episteme. 
2.2 Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace 
Johan Galtung’s prolific work, which spans over five decades and covers a 
wide array of topics, has contributed to shape many of the debates of the field. 
Among them, the epistemological and methodological character of peace research 
has been one of the recurrent topics throughout his work. Galtung moved from his 
early reliance on empiricism and orthodox social sciences as the basis of rigorous 
knowledge (Lawler, 1995) towards a more comprehensive methodological 
approach including data, theories and values (Galtung, 1985a, 1996; Lawler, 1995). 
For the author, to promote peace and not only peace studies, “a non-positivistic 
epistemology is indispensable” (Galtung, 1996: vii), therefore a critical approach 
based on values has to be accompanied by a constructive one  that confronts 
theories with values to produce changes in realities, and not only in theories 
(Galtung, 1996, 9-13). 
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Parallel to his explorations of the cultural aspects of violence, he focused on 
the elements in cultures that oppose cultural violence. For Galtung, 
 
 there is also much optimistic inspiration to be gained from a 
civilizational perspective. The word peace translates into different 
words in different languages, all of them having different 
connotations, showing different facets of peace (1985a: 155).   
In that statement peace remains a universal and totalizing reference according 
to which other concepts will be fragmented. Galtung (1981: 194) disclaimsº that to 
translate all the different concepts from different cultures into the English concept 
of peace may be methodologically open to objection. He counter-argues that these 
concepts are almost autotelic and that they represent some of the highest goals of 
their traditions. However, the analysis that follows is based on the assumption that 
the problem behind this reductionism is not a matter of semantics, but of power. A 
symbolic power that endows a legitimacy that otherwise the concept of peace 
would not have, to paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu (1991; quoted in Neoh, 2008: 11-
12). This symbolic power sustains relations of domination by concealing them. 
Bourdieu outlines the role of language and representation in the construction of 
reality, and the political significance of naming, which “imply a certain claim to 
symbolic authority as the socially recognized power to impose a certain vision and 
division on the social world” (Neoh, 2008:  12; italics in the original). 
In the article, “Social Cosmology and the Concept of Peace” (Galtung, 1981), 
the author set the basis for his subsequent civilization theory developed in “Peace 
by Peaceful Means” (1996) which covers other aspects such as development. For 
the scope of this chapter, I will mainly focus on the earlier paper unless otherwise 
stated.  
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Galtung carries out a hermeneutical exercise of the concept of peace across 
civilizations by means of a taxonomic classification of cultures according to certain 
aspects. A main distinction is first established contrasting what the author calls the 
Occident with the Orient. If the core of the Occident is epitomized by Christianity, 
the Orient is defined by Buddhism (Galtung, 1996: 81). The dualistic cartographic 
division is sustained, according to Galtung, by the shared features of the social 
cosmology of the different civilizations contained in the Occident and the Orient. 
In his civilization theory, Galtung defines a social cosmology as the “(…) 
collectively held subconscious ideas about what constitutes normal and natural 
reality” (1996: 211; italics in the original). Edward Said would have much to say 
about portraying these two separate entities as real: 
 the notion that there are geographical spaces with indigenous, 
radically ‘different’ inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of 
some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical 
space is equally a highly debatable idea (1978: 322). 
Galtung’s “impressionistic” (1996: 211) portray of civilizations is questioned 
by Lawler (1995: 195) on the basis of his reductionist and objectified view of 
cultures, civilizations and cosmologies, which verges on essentialism, by “isolating 
out a definitive cosmological key (…) as an explanatory master category”. Indeed, 
few evidences are provided to support his argument, except for the few and 
selected references to the multi-faceted scriptural religious texts. No account is 
provided of internal diversities, of complexities, interactions, or contradictions 
within traditions and societies themselves. In a latter text, Galtung (1996: 212, 213) 
lists what is left outside of his Occident-Orient spectrum, the rest consists of 
African, Amerindian and Asia-Pacific indigenous cultures, as well as Viêt Namese 
and Korean cultures. 
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Occidental civilization lumps together the Hebrew, Islam, Christian, Roman, 
Greek, Middle Age and the Modern Western traditions (Galtung, 1981: 183). This 
questionable classification juxtaposes historical periods and civilizations, religious 
traditions and cultures, under the label Occident. Galtung (1981) supports his 
classification by the shared cosmology of these traditions that is reflected in their 
concepts of peace which   
(…) will tend to make a very clear distinction between in-group and 
out-group, center and periphery, or however one might refer to a distinction 
between 'us' and 'them'; and they will tend to be universalizing, 
encompassing the whole (known) universe (Galtung, 1981: 184). 
 Consequently, peace is reserved for in-group, and war for out-group 
relations. This idea pervades in Galtung’s view of peace in the Hebrew tradition, 
Shâlôm, as defined by a vertical relation, a pact between God and the Chosen 
People. The author extends the monotheist argument to Christianity and Islam to 
attribute the same protective tendency towards the self, and aggressiveness towards 
the others (Galtung, 1981: 184-185). In the case of Islam, Galtung (1981: 186; 
italics in the original) distinguishes between “dar-al-Islam (the House of Islam, the 
house of peace) and the dar-al-harb, the house of war” to further argue that jihad is 
a principle to justify the latter. As Ishida (1969, in Lawler, 1995: 197) states, “the 
so called bellicosity of Islam (…) is a biased Christian interpretation”. Moreover, 
the concept of jihad, according to Rabbia Terri Harris (2007: 108), meaning 
struggle or effort has a twofold component: a greater struggle that involves an 
inward effort directed to confront “our lower nature”, and a lesser struggle, 
outwards oriented against social injustice. 
The pax romana, eirene, pax ecclesiae, from the Roman, Greek, and Middle 
Age traditions respectively, are used by the author to confirm his hypothesis of the 
Occident peace as exclusive and universalist (Galtung, 1981: 185-188). The Middle 
 66 
 
Age is described by Galtung (1981: 187) as “the Oriental time pocket in Occidental 
history”. Edward Said (1978: 67) stated that “[t]o the Westerner, (…) the Oriental 
was always like some aspect of the West.” Galtung follows here the inverse logic 
although with the same result. 
Galtung’s “cursory” description of the Orient (Lawler, 1995: 204) amalgams 
heterogeneous categories such as Indian, Jainism, Buddhism, Gandhism, Chinese 
and Japanese traditions, since their social cosmologies are characterized by a 
shared inward orientation or introversion and inner harmony. This argument is 
grounded on the hermeneutics of concepts like ahimsa, shanti, hop’ ing, and heiwa 
(galtung, 1981: 191).   
Lawler (1995: 209) criticizes that “[t]he connection between the abstracted 
ideal and the historical reality is tenuous.” For instance, in the case of Chinese 
peace, Galtung distinguishes during “the period of the hundred philosophers” 
(1981: 192) between the existence of the Buddhist, the Daoist and the Confucian 
trends, which he briefly proceeds to define. Tam Wai Lum (2007: 38-52) argues 
that these traditions were only followed by a well-educated elite, whereas 
grassroots Chinese people practiced different local traditions, religions and rituals. 
Both spheres influenced each other’s practices.  
Following the critique of the Occident and the presentation of the Oriental 
peace concepts, Galtung (1985b, 1996) focuses on Buddhist civilization since it “is 
the major system of belief that, to my mind, comes closest in its way of looking at 
the world to the type of dynamic, highly complex peace theory (…)” (1985b: 3). 
Lawler (1995: 211) argues that although Buddhism is not portrayed in such a brief 
and passive way as the other civilizations, “the translatability of Buddhism into a 
practical discourse of peace (…) rather than [the] exposition of its philosophical 
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substance (…) differs little from the bulk of Western writing on Buddhist moral 
philosophy that has largely been confined to the business of ‘simple descriptive 
ethics’.”  
Galtung relates Buddhist notions of dukkha (avoidance of suffering) and 
sukha (bliss, joy) to the concepts of negative and positive peace respectively (1996: 
2), as parts of the processes towards the “goal of the whole exercise in human 
space” (Galtung, 1985b: 10): nirvana. “Nirvana is entropy, peace is entropy - 
hence, in a certain sense peace is nirvana and nirvana is peace” (Galtung, 1985b: 
11), an adventurous statement considering the amount of context that such a 
concept, and the experience of Buddhahood require. Bibhuti S. Yadav (1977: 451) 
outlines the silence surrounding the definition of nirvana in Buddhist texts: “[t]he 
issue is clearly methodological, of showing that a Buddhist must reject 
epistemology as the methodology of talking about Nirvana.” Yadav (1977: 451) 
refers to the ancient Indian philosophers Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna rejection of 
the is/is-not thinking, the former “equates the logic of 'is' and 'not-is' with suffering, 
and argues that the Buddha's silence about Nirvana is a therapeutical proposal 
tliberate mankind from either/or logic.” 
Summing up, Galtung’s hermeneutic proposal is based on the abstraction of 
certain features to define and contrast cultures according to peace. In line with the 
categorical violence of the previous section, Claude Alvares, (1988: 36) states that 
abstraction is accompanied by the other side of the coin, restriction: “[I]n the 
process of abstraction, one restricts reality by abstracting certain features and 
ignoring others.” Scott (1988: 77) posits that the broader the categories, the less 
detailed and accurate, the more sketchy and schematic the information, the more 
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useful the process of apprehending a complex reality is, since its purpose is to 
simplify, to reduce the range of variations.  
This goes hand in hand with the scientific reduction of diversity stated in the 
previous chapter, since in its inability to reproduce it, science creates “more 
simplified, mechanized designs instead” (Alvares, 1988: 44). The result is a 
taxonomic and dichotomic proposal that presents a simplified and objectified 
version of cultures not very conducive to the authors’ attempted dialogue between 
cosmologies. In spite of his critical and value-charged approach, the pervasive 
scientific attitude and empiricist character of the research is evident in Galtung’s 
position as an external observer labelling, categorizing, and drawing quick 
conclusions from a set of premises (Lawler, 1995).  
 
2.3 The human potential for peace 
A recurring thesis in Douglas P. Fry’s work (2007, 2005, 2013) is that the 
assumptions of war as innate, universal, and the intrinsic tendency to violence of 
human being are deeply rooted in Western cultural beliefs. For Fry (2007, 2013),  
this naturalized view of human nature, that spans from Hesiod and Thucydides to 
Hobbes, impregnates Western perceptions of the world and consequently biases 
scientific practices and peace research. The author claims that to go beyond the 
distortion produced by ingrained and unquestioned cultural beliefs, the 
reinforcement of scientific objectivity in peace research is needed,  
Rather than relax the striving for objectivity and adherence to the 
canons of science, the way to address this serious problem, I suggest, 
is to develop a greater awareness of the powerful grasp that cultural 
beliefs have on research related to peace and war, strive for self-
awareness of one’s own beliefs and biases regarding this topic, and 
apply the rigors of well-practiced science to one’s own research and 
to the assessment of the findings of others (Fry, 2013: 1). 
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What Fry calls to overcome is what Bacon called the Idols of the Theatre in 
his Four Idols doctrine, constraints that interfere between the world, human mind 
and its understanding of the world; constraints which divert science from being 
“seen as a faithful representation of the truth about the world, as a transcript of the 
divine mind” (Bajaj, 1988: 29). Thomas Kuhn (1962) questioned the positivist 
notion of objectivity arguing that the so-called objective reality is determined by 
the influence of the prevailing scientific paradigms on the scientist. However, 
Vandana Shiva considers Kuhn’s view as incomplete since “it failed to provide an 
adequate epistemological framework for handling the violence of reductionist 
science” (1988: 90). Kuhn limits his critique to the scientific world without 
considering how social, political and economic interests determine scientific facts.   
The call for the high standards of truth and objectivity might be in itself a 
reflection of the cultural and disciplinary values which Fry calls to be alert of. As it 
was covered in the previous chapter, the view of science as an objective authority 
contrasts with the local, contextual consideration of other systems of knowledge. 
The position of science as the only way to understand and interpret reality denies 
the validity of other forms of knowledge, therefore it rejects the possibility of 
articulation of different knowledges, reproducing and maintaining colonial 
relations (Santos, 2007b, Scott, 1989).  
Drawing on archaeology, cultural anthropology, paleontology and behavioral 
ecology, Fry explores and compares the views of peace and war across different 
times and cultures to provide evidences of a less violent view of humanity.  
Fry calls “to learn from peaceful societies” (Fry, 2005) since societies “with 
extremely low levels of expressed physical aggression offer insights for developing 
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a culture of peace” (Fry, Bonta and Basarkiewicz, 2009: 20). The concept of 
peaceful societies will be covered in the next section. 
 Based on ethnographic research, Fry identifies values, beliefs and behavioral 
attitudes toward conflict, decision making processes, conflict management 
procedures, social control mechanisms to prevent conflict, and socialization 
processes that characterize these societies and are conducive to peaceful 
coexistence. According to these parameters, and supported by data, he identifies 
more than 60 cultures of peace, in their most, indigenous groups, which he places 
on a non-violence / violence continuum (Fry, 2005: 152-167). However, Fry’s 
writing reflects more a learn-about or learn-over approach than a learn-from one, 
since it is the scientist who imposes the terms of the dialogue taking for granted 
that his premises are accepted by the communities.  
The author (Fry, 2005) compares two Zapotec communities, La Paz and San 
Andrés, according to the parameters mentioned above to contrast their approaches 
to conflict and peace. For Fry (2005), La Paz is a peaceful community, with low 
levels of aggression, peace is based on respect for others, supported by a value 
system that promotes cooperation, and creates an affective environment for 
children to be socialized, whereas research conducted in San Andrés shows a 
higher level of physical and verbal aggression.  
From a categorical violence point of view, Fry isolates certain elements that 
he considers relevant for the study of peace to make these two societies legible, 
obtaining a schematic and static view of them, more convenient for his analysis. As 
Scott (1998: 11) argues, 
Certain forms of knowledge and control require a narrowing of vision. The 
great advantage of such tunnel vision is that it brings into sharp focus certain 
limited aspects of an otherwise far more complex and unwieldy reality. This 
very simplification, in turn, makes the phenomenon at the center of the field of 
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vision more legible and hence more susceptible to careful measurement and 
calculation. Combined with similar observations, an overall, aggregate, 
synoptic view of a selective reality is achieved, making possible a high degree 
of schematic knowledge, control, and manipulation. 
 
Scott (1998) points out that this process of categorization is not necessarily 
harmful, it is in connection with the authority of science that enables manipulation 
and control. As a sample of re-mapping and re-ordering reality, La Paz, whose 
administrative or local name is not mentioned, receives its academic name from 
anthropologist Carl W. O’Nell, whose fieldwork in the 1960’s in the Valley of 
Oaxaca outlined the peacefulness of the community (Fry, 2005: 60). Following 
Scott’s line of argument, Joshuah Neoh (2008: 11) calls for not to underrate the 
importance of naming and labelling since they “play a vital role in determining 
identities, cultural affiliations, and histories; they can help fracture or unify groups of 
people.” 
 The intricacy and complexity of Zapotec reality is simplified, presented in a 
frozen, ahistorical way, and assimilated into a grid which codifies observed elements 
like the value of respect, the frequency of physical fights, swearing, child and wife-
beatings, the self-image of the community, the homicide rate, the response to child 
misconduct, and the level of obedience of children in both communities. Vandana 
Shiva (1988: 89) denounces a threefold exclusion derived from this methodology,  
(i) ontological, in that other properties are not taken note of; (ii) 
epistemological, in that other ways of perceiving and knowing are 
not recognized; and (iii) sociological, in that the non-expert is 
deprived of the right both of access to knowledge and of judging the 
claims of knowledge. 
 
 Among the “psychocultural mechanisms” identified to prevent conflict and deter 
aggression in La Paz, Fry (2005: 67-69) outlines fear of illness and of witchcraft.  
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 Concerning illness, Fry (2005: 69) states that Zapotec from La Paz believe that 
coraje and bilis can cause aggression, these exempts the patients from being judged. 
He concludes that “[t]he key point is that by interpreting anger and aggression as 
resulting from an illness, La Pazians deny the existence of hostility” (Fry, 2005: 69). 
The author (Fry, 2005: 69) posits that people from La Paz belief that the experience 
of aggression can be frightening and that causes fright sickness or susto. Fry (2005: 
69) states that “[b]eliefs that violence can cause susto in oneself or others provide 
another psychocultural check on aggression.”  
Fry analyzes illness and conflict from his own ontological standpoint, regardless of 
the ontological and epistemological conceptions of the Zapotecs of La Paz, who are 
positioned as a “theoretical patient” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 70) rather than as an 
agent. The dichotomy between interior mental states and external behavioral 
responses underlies Fry’s analysis which places coraje, susto and bilis as products of 
the human psyche. Paraphrasing Ingold (2000: 95), for Lapazians, aggression causes 
susto because they experience it as such, whereas for the scientist susto is a 
construction of the people’s mind. 
By this move, (…) [Lapazian] metaphysics appear to pose no challenge to 
our own ontological certainties. Turning our backs on what (…) people say, 
we continue to insist that ‘real’ reality is given independently of human 
experience, and that understanding its nature is a problem for science. 
(Ingold, 2000: 95) 
 
The studied communities’ conceptions of being and knowing, their cosmologies 
and “ontological self-determination” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 18)1 do not prevail 
over “(…) the reduction of human (and non-human) thought to a device of 
                                                          
1
 “autodeterminación ontológica”, own translation. 
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recognition: classification, prediction, judgment, representation (…)” (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2010: 18)
1
.  
The researcher has defined the terms in which these two communities will be put 
into relation. These terms mirror the values, beliefs and intellectual concerns of the 
society that carries out the study rather than that which is studied. Since Fry’s 
intention was to learn from other cultures, by projecting the self onto the other, the 
opportunity to surprise ourselves by reflecting an image where we do not recognize 
ourselves is missed (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 15). 
A similar analysis could be made from Fry’s work on nomadic forager societies 
which occupy a central place in his research (Fry, 2005, 2007, 2013). For the author, 
the two million years of existence of this lifestyle allows to obtain insights about the 
past and the peacefulness of human nature (Fry, 2013: 6-12).  
From the position of the explicative subject, and with the synoptic view that 
science provides (Scott, 1998), the author engages in a taxonomic exercise that 
classifies forager societies into simple and complex hunter-gatherers through the 
isolation of certain features. The former includes nomadic bands with small, simple, 
egalitarian and non-hierarchical forms of social organization. The latter consists of 
horse-dependent or sedentary groups with higher population density, a hierarchical 
political system with class distinctions, and the use of slaves.  
A subsequent step places simple and complex hunter gatherers as parts of a 
classificatory grid which uses peace and war –according to the above mentioned 
parameters– as a unit of measure to distinguish between warring and non-warring 
societies. The synoptic facts that it provides allows to conclude that “social 
                                                          
1
 “(…) la reducción del pensamiento humano (y no humano) a un dispositivo de reconocimiento: 
clasificación, predicción, juicio, representación…(…)”, own translation. 
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complexity and adoption of the horse go along with warfare” (Fry, 2007: 78), 
whereas nomadic bands tend to be more peaceful (Fry, 2007: 77-80).  
Consequent with his schema, on a latter work, he focuses his research on the 
nomadic bands since their simple organization and their peaceful nature allow “to 
draw inferences about the past” (Fry, 2013: 9). An evolutionist point of view that 
places the researchers’ Time as the reference, and situates these groups as 
contemporary relics, an example of the denial of coevalness (Fabian, 1983) discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
As in the case of the Zapotec analyzed above, his study presents several specific 
cases of nomadic forager bands drawing on ethnographic research where the rate of 
homicide, the values and attitudes towards violence, the causes of conflict and the 
mechanisms for its resolution are examined (Fry, 2013). These serve as processes of 
simplification and standardization to make hunter-gatherer’s realities legible, 
comparable, and classifiable. The author assumes that these units of measure are 
accepted by the rest, and therefore they define the terms of the conversation. This 
way of abstracting peace by isolation of certain elements in hunter-gatherers societies 
silences the way they apprehend the world, not based on detachment and mental 
representation, but on engagement, “not of making a view of the world but of taking 
up a view in it” (Ingold 2000: 42). The author states concerning hunter-gatherers that, 
(…) knowledge does not lie in the accumulation of mental content. It 
is not by representing it in the mind that they get to know the world, 
but rather by moving around in their environment, whether in dreams 
or waking life, by watching, listening and feeling, actively seeking 
out the signs by which it is revealed. Experience, here, amounts to a 
kind of sensory participation, a coupling of the movement of one’s 
own awareness to the movement of aspects of the world. And the 
kind of knowledge it yields is not propositional, in the form of 
hypothetical statements or ‘beliefs’ about the nature of reality, but 
personal – consisting of an intimate sensitivity to other ways of 
being, to the particular movements, habits and temperaments that 
reveal each for what it is (Ingold, 2000: 99). 
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2.5 Peaceful Societies 
The organization Peaceful Societies is dedicated to the study of social groups 
with low levels of internal violence and absence of external warfare. It publishes 
its work on the website www.peacefulsocieties.org which was started in 2005 by 
Bruce Bonta, inspired by the work of Elise Boulding, and it is maintained by the 
contributions of a group of peace researchers, among them Douglas P. Fry, whose 
work, introduced in the previous section, shares many similarities with this 
project. 
The website contains the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies which compiles 
descriptions of 25 societies that “promote harmony, gentleness, and kindness 
toward others as much as they devalue conflict, aggressiveness, and violence”, in 
order to “inspire —and challenge—anyone interested in the processes of peace 
building” (Peaceful Societies, 2014). 
Although the authors state that their intention is not to dichotomize between 
peaceful and non-peaceful societies, but to situate them in a peace-violence 
continuum (Peaceful Societies, 2014), it has a twofold exclusionary character 
since the abyssal thinking (Santos, 2007c) referred to in the first chapter, 
structures the whole theory of peaceful societies.  
On one side, paraphrasing Guha (1989), the positivist category of peaceful 
societies, which is used to label certain social groups based on observation and 
abstraction of selected features, constitutes a romantic and positive Other, “a body 
wholly separate and alien” (Guha, 1989: 97) from the self, and defined by a 
peaceful essence. Concerning the dangers of creating categories that lead to us/ 
them distinctions, Edward Said asks,   
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Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be 
genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, 
societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly? (Said, 1978: 
45). 
On the other side, whether peaceful or not, it is the hegemonic subject of the 
scientist who decides and classifies societies, “[i]n the field of knowledge, abyssal 
thinking consists in granting to modern science the monopoly of the universal 
distinction between true and false (…)” (Santos, 2007c: 47). This is made explicit 
by the authors of the website in their “criteria for inclusion” (Peaceful Societies, 
2014) for the Encyclopedia: (i) they have to be described by an anthropologist or a 
sociologist as peaceful or nonviolent, (ii) the scientist must provide “convincing 
evidence” about the peacefulness of the society, in case of contradictory evidences 
the society will be excluded, (iii) the existence of  “enough scholarly literature 
about the society to allow a reasonably well-formed picture to emerge about their 
social, psychological, and cultural makeup” (Peaceful Societies, 2014). 
 Paul Robbins (2012: 125) argues that, considering the exclusive and arbitrary 
character of any classification and categorization, the main difference between 
science and other forms of knowledge is not accuracy but the political and social 
power linked to the former. He then draws on Foucault to ask,   
when we establish a considered classification, when we say that a cat and a 
dog resemble each other less than two greyhounds do, even if both are tame 
or embalmed, even if both are frenzied, even if both have just broken the 
water pitcher, what is the ground on which we are able to establish the 
validity of this classification with complete certainty? On what “table,” 
according to what grid of identities, similitudes, analogies, have we become 
accustomed to sort out so many different and similar things? (Foucault, 
1977; quoted in Robbins, 2012: 125)  
Santos (2007c: 68) explains the contrast between the progressive increase of the 
recognition of cultural diversity during the last decades and the lack of recognition 
of the epistemological diversity, relying on the distinction between beliefs and 
ideas as posited by Ortega y Gasset. Whereas beliefs are an integral part of our 
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identity, they come from the absence of doubt, ideas, that is, science and 
philosophy, are exterior to us, their origin lies in uncertainties and remain 
associated with them. This implies a distinction between being and having, “we 
are what we belief but we have ideas” (Santos, 2007c: 68). Modern science 
belongs to both, ideas and beliefs. “Belief in science greatly exceeds anything 
scientific ideas enables us to realize” (Santos, 2007c: 68). The critique of science 
during the second half of the twentieth century contrasted with an increasing 
popular belief in science. As Santos comtends “The relationship between beliefs 
and ideas as related to science is no longer a relationship between two distinct 
entities but rather a relationship between two ways of socially experiencing 
science” (Santos, 2007c: 68). This duality is what separates cultural from 
epistemological recognition of diversity. 
Back to the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, the ehtnogrpahic present tense 
used to describe these societies, as in the previous section, represents them as 
frozen, timeless, with few accounts of historical changes, political struggles or 
responses to the interactions with modernity in economic, social and cultural 
terms. For anthropologist Renato Rosaldo (1993: 31), these are characteristics of 
the first ethnographic writings, whose complicity with colonial practices was 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The portrait of colonized cultures as 
harmonious, homogeneous and unchanging fostered the civilizational mission, the 
idea that these societies need to progress in economic, cultural and moral terms. 
The view of the anthropologist as the detached observer that objectifies and 
extracts raw material to be processed later has been overcome by the discipline 
(Rosaldo, 1993). 
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Moreover, this way of presenting them as static, almost isolated strongholds of 
nonviolence reveals a tendency to romanticize these societies, in spite of the 
authors’ disclaimer against a utopic, idealist portrayal of these groups, arguing 
that descriptions are supported by scholar evidences (Peaceful Societies, 2014).  
Every entry of the Encyclopedia is described according to sections that briefly 
present information about the geographical location and economic activity, beliefs 
that foster peacefulness, forms of avoiding and resolving conflict, gender 
relations, socialization of children, social practices, sense of the self, moral values, 
and a conclusion (Peaceful societies, 2014).  
Rosaldo (1993: 26) warns against the imposition of categories and the tendency 
of trying to understand other forms of life in Western terms. To analyze 25 
different social groups by the same grid risks falling into orthopedic thinking, 
which results in silencing and denying theoretical imagination to these groups.  As 
it was argued in the previous section, this form of analyzing peace as a category 
product of the summation of separate aspects and indicators added together may 
not coincide with the way these societies perceive peace, in case they have a 
separate objetified concept of peace. The authors attempt to identify and compare  
psychological, cultural, social, ethical and religious structures of these groups to 
explain peace, reflects their own assumptions, As Alastair McIntosh  puts 
forward, 
(…) the reductionist worldview is blind to alternative ways of knowing such 
as aesthetic sensibility, inner vision, intuition and mystical experience 
(which can be empirically studied). It has canonised reason alone, but a 
dwarfed reason that rattles around in the vacuum of its own echo chamber, 
imagining itself to have trumped the divine mystery (McIntosh, 2012: 43). 
To illustrate this, Semai people, a group of Orang Asli, Malaysian Aborigines, 
included in the Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, do not conceive peace as a 
separate category, “(…) equality, sustainability and peace, rather than existing as 
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three separate cultural ideals or attributes, are intertwined and interconnected” 
(Gomes, 2012: 1062).  
Although I will not extend on the details, anthropologist Alberto Gomes (2012) 
explains how Semai knowledge is connected with nature and embedded in 
cultural and religious practices and beliefs. These reveal an eco-centric 
perspective which is translated in a respectful relation with nature. Spiritual 
practices underpin physical reality –there is no separation between the sacred and 
the secular– and shapes ecological knowledge. The centrality of nature as part of 
Semai identity is manifested in their relation with the past, since history is 
expressed through the place where an event took place rather than temporalized.  
Concerning practices that foster social cohesion, Semai people are organized 
through a consensual political system that promotes inclusion and discourages the 
imposition of power. Sharing and reciprocity are generalized practices that have a 
moral and economic component, they serve to balance possible inequalities and 
avoid accumulation. In that sense, cooperation and interdependence is not at odds 
with individual autonomy, understood as social flexibility rather than 
individualism. Land ownership is another cohesive aspect of Semai people since it 
is not held privately but through a communal system that assures access to land 
and resources on an equal basis. The communal ownership entails not only 
humans but spirits too, to whom permission has to be asked for before working 
the land.   
These tenets, beliefs and practices are conducive to peace. Conflicts are avoided 
and when they arise, strategies for resolving conflicts in a nonviolent way are 
employed.  
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Gomes (unpublished work) accounts of the implications on Semai lives of the 
increasing contact with modernity and capitalism. Commoditization, privatization 
and over-exploitation of resources result in the impoverishment of their lives in 
economic, social and cultural ways and the displacement of their traditional 
knowledges, values, perceptions and practices. 
 Semai, as other indigenous groups referred to in the previous chapter, do not 
suit Cartesian ontology, their knowledge is interconnected with their everyday 
practices. Nature, economy, relations with the past and other social and religious 
practices are interconnected. Therefore, to isolate and objectify peace from these 
practices assimilating Semai worldviews to Western concepts denies validity to 
Semai knowledge and subjectivity. As it was argued in the previous chapter, this 
is a manifestation of the imposition by modern science of the conception of 
knowledge-as-regulation, rather than knowledge-as-emancipation, the former 
conceives knowledge as order, the latter, as solidarity (Santos, 2007b). In that 
sense, scholars from different disciplines (Gomes, 2012; McIntosh, 2012; Santos, 
2010, 2007b) call to learn from and with these discarded epistemologies instead of 
learning about them: 
“[W]e can learn to seek unity less by attempting to recruit others as 
subcontractors to build our own utopias, or by trying to find a 
monolithic "truth of nature" to impose on the world, and more 
through solidarity with subordinate groups pursuing, on different 
terrains, purposes that may be related to our own. That solidarity 
requires that even our most cherished dichotomies be challenged by 
the stories other societies tell” (Lohman, 1993). 
 
Conclusions 
The four cases analyzed in this chapter evidence the unequal relations between 
different forms of knowledge. Despite the existent proposals to expand the 
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epistemological limits of the discipline, a narrow view of science characterized by 
a positivist epistemology pervades peace studies. 
The hegemonic subject of the scientist conditions and defines the premises of 
the conversation, labelling, ordering, classifying, and imposing his/her own views 
on other realities through a narrow vision that discriminates and ignores what 
he/she considers not to be convenient for the re-ordering of the world. Therefore, 
in these examples, the attempted intercultural dialogue covered in the previous 
chapter turns into a dialogue between peace researchers. 
Through this Western lens, peace, either singular or plural, is conceived as an 
unquestioned universal concept to which other cultures will be brought into – 
mainly through appropriation or assimilation–  turned into raw material for the 
production of theory and presented in an objectified form. Inscribing Western 
concerns and conceptual tools onto other people strange to them is what has been 
called orthopedic thinking. 
The consequence of these orthopedic peaces is the exclusion and devaluation of 
other forms of knowledge and practices, discarding, silencing and removing other 
people from their ways of experiencing the world, thereby maintaining imperialist 
relations of epistemological domination, a reflection of economic, social and 
political relations. 
Next chapter proposes what Santos (2010) called “sociology of absences” and a 
move to knowledge-as-solidarity. It proposes to look at Fulani worldviews and 
practices, and attempts to establish dialogues with Heimatkunde from Germanic 
tradition, and with Aymara cosmologies.    
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Chapter III 
Fulani Cosmology 
Introduction 
To overcome the metonymic reason –the one that asserts to be the only form of 
rationality– that characterizes the four cases analyzed in the previous chapter, De 
Sousa Santos (2007a, 2007b, 2009) proposes “the sociology of absences”, a 
procedure oriented to reveal that the non-existent has been actively produced as no-
existent. As it was discussed in the first chapter, according to Santos there are five 
major forces that lead to the production of non-existence: the monoculture of 
knowledge, the monoculture of linear time, the monoculture of the naturalization of 
the difference, the monoculture of the dominant scale and the monoculture of the 
productivist logic. To question the monoculture of knowledge, which this thesis is 
focused upon, Santos (2007c) formulates the necessity of an “ecology of 
knowledges” that identifies and puts into dialogue forms of knowledges, values, 
practices, beliefs, and other criteria of rigor that seek a global cognitive justice, since, 
as it has been contended, forms knowledge and of existence cannot be delinked from 
politics. 
In a similar vein, Gomes (2012) calls for the recovery of marginalized 
indigenous knowledges, for the ecologically sensitive values and principles that 
sustain them may contribute to question and shift current economic and ecologic 
paradigms.  Recovery is not meant as a look to the past in the search for idyllic and 
romanticized lifestyles, but as a look to currently existing and resisting perspectives 
of people that creatively combine their lifestyle with the forces of modernity. As 
Leonhard Praeg (2014: 14) posits, the point is not to tell the “world about lost, ancient 
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civilizations because they are interesting, but because every act of recollection is an 
act of struggle that seeks to make a point.”  
In accordance with that, this chapter focuses on certain facets of Fulani, 
concretely of Wodaabe Fulani nomadic herders from Niger, knowledge, practices, 
and beliefs.  To this effect, I draw on ethnographic and linguistic accounts, and on 
initiatory tales and mythological texts from Fulani oral tradition.   
This chapter is organized in four sections. The first section briefly situates 
Fulani and Wodaabe, and defines my position concerning ethnicity.  The second 
section covers Fulani cosmology, specifically the role of the cow and the milk in their 
economic, social, spiritual and cultural practices.  The third section focuses on the 
moral code of Fulani and presents a case of conflict resolution by means of its 
application.  The fourth section proposes first, a look into Fulani relations with the 
environment, their conceptions of place and their connection to the land; and second, 
a comparison with other traditions that share similar concerns, namely Heimatkunde 
from the German speaking tradition, and Aymara cosmology through the work of 
Rodolfo Kusch and his philosophy of estar.   
3. 1 Introductory considerations 
Fulani people, with a population of circa 15 million, live scattered in more than 
a dozen countries, from the Senegal to the Nile rivers, being only a majority in 
Guinea Conakry (Fig. 1).  The disparity of political, social, economic and 
environmental contexts, and the derived interactions, shape their activities, and 
worldviews in different ways.  Consequently, and following feminist approaches that 
consider identity as multiple, and their formation dynamic, contextual, negotiated and 
tied to their historical and political contexts (Loftsdottir, 2001, 2007), it would be too 
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adventurous to provide any general statement about Fulani identity as a monolithic 
and homogenous ethnic group in spite that, as some scholars (Gordon, 2000; Sow, 
2005) posit, their sense of identity and kinship transcends national boundaries.  
 
Fig.  1 
As Terence Ranger (1999; quoted in Lotftsdotti, 2007: 67) argues, concepts like 
tribe and ethnicity have been associated with African societies in an essentialist 
manner.  Therefore, since I am going to prioritize ethnicity, certain aspects have to be 
considered, for ethnonyms, as the term Fulani, risk of being assigned with a single 
reference (Amselle, 1998: 46).  Some anthropologists (Barth, 1969; Wimmer, 2013) 
stress the role of boundary making, and social closure expressed “along ethnic lines” 
(Wimmer, 2013: 14), rather than shared, objective, defined cultural traits to establish 
ethnic distinctions in a society.  Thereby, “two ethnic groups should differ in 
worldviews and values only if the boundary between them is marked by high levels 
of exclusion and closure” (Wimmer, 2013: 14).  Thus, the focus on ethnicity is not 
understood as objectively defined cultures, but as the subjective forms in which social 
groups define the boundaries “by pointing to specific diacritics that distinguished 
them from ethnic others” (Wimmer, 2008: 23).  
 86 
 
  Another aspect not to be overlooked is the colonial influence on identity 
formation and the reification on ethnicity.  Jean Loup Amselle (1998: xiii) puts 
forward that the colonial administrators’ rigid attempt to organize and define human 
diversity transformed existing “chains of societies”, flexible and interconnected, into 
different institutionalized ethnic groups.  The author illustrates this by questioning the 
concept of Fulani in itself.  In that sense, anthropologists (Amselle, 1998; Breedveld 
and De Bruijn, 1996) argue that the construction of Fulani ethnic group is linked to 
nineteenth and early twentieth century historiography and anthropology.  The idea of 
racial struggle transposed to West Africa by historians placed different races as 
conqueror and conquered, and situated a fantasized Fulani origin outside of the Black 
African context.  Inquiry on their origin and the quest for a Fulani essence continues 
today focusing on the construction of Fulani herders as a “self-sufficient enclave” 
(Amselle, 1998: 46) independent of their context.  On the contrary, Fulani as an entity 
is the result of continuous modifications of political and religious formations 
(Amselle, 1998: 49).   However, Breedveld and De Brujin (1996) differ with Amselle 
arguing that it is not that Fulani did not exist before colonization, but the colonial and 
the postcolonial states altered and reinforced ethnicity.  
Without denying the importance of colonial and postcolonial powers in shaping 
and stiffening ethnic categories, to overemphasize this angle of ethnicity might 
simplify and reduce to colonial constructions the complexity of ethnic boundary 
making.   This might be at odds with the idea of the fluidity and contextuality of 
identities, for it completely displaces Fulani agency on colonial and postcolonial 
states, and ignores “the embodied experience of cultural understandings of the world” 
(Loftsdottir, 2001: 282) which provide meaning to belonging to a specific group 
(Loftsdottir, 2007:  82-83; 2001: 281-282).  The latter point is particularly significant 
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since, as it will be broaden in this section, Fulani sense of identity is understood as 
closely linked to their conceptualization of the environment, coming their cosmology 
and organization of the world from their everyday physical experience with the 
environment and animals (Loftsdottir, 2001; Sow, 2005, 2006).   In that sense, 
following Anthony Smith (1999: quoted in Loftsdottir, 2007: 67), “earlier ethnic ties 
and memories” have to be taken into account without ignoring that these ties and 
memories can acquire different meaning in a continuous changing process of meaning 
construction, and can be used differently depending on the context and the individual.  
The dynamic conception of life and identity is expressed in the Fulani proverb, “A 
man has not been completely created until his death” (Sow, 2001: 557)1.  
Fulani recognized themselves originally by their language, Fulfulde, and by 
their economic activity, the transhumant bovine livestock breeding.  This identity trait 
was broaden by their incorporation of Islam and its territorial expansion in which they 
actively participated; later, with French colonialism they were established within the 
limits of the current nation-states.  Fulani traditionally distinguished between Ful’be 
na’i (cow fulbe), nomadic herders; Ful’be diina (book fulbe), linked to Islam teaching 
and Koranic schools; and Ful’be tube (drum fulbe), who held power in big territories 
and ancient states (Sow, 2006: 2-3).   
Today, Fulani differentiate between Fui’be si’iire (town fulbe) and Ful’be na’i.  
The latter can be found in a variety of settings and occupations; some may live as 
sedentary combining agriculture and shepherding, others have a semi-nomadic 
lifestyle although living in agricultural areas from where they organize their 
displacements, whereas certain groups, like Wodaabe, carry a nomadic transhumant 
life.   
                                                          
1
 “Tant que l'homme n'est pas mort, il n'a pas fini d'etre cree” (Sow, 2001: 557 my translation).   
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Fulbe’si’iire, which constitute the majority of Fulani population, participate in 
the activities of the big city and modern life with no direct relation to pastoral 
practices, although anchored to the bush and their villages of origin by their family 
ties to whom they entrust their cattle (Sow, 2001: 557, 2006: 2).  This strong link to 
the family and the place of origin is maintained from Senegal until the West side of 
Niger, where the four initial Fulani clannish surnames are still functional (Sow, 
2006).  Besides the clannish link, Fulani sense of kinship is illustrated by the concept 
dyokkèrè endan, meaning to “follow the sap of the tree” (Gordon, 2000: 314), a 
metaphor which calls to maintain family, in-laws, and community ties and bonds of 
solidarity.  Moreover, the instrumental use of ethnicity in certain postcolonial West 
African countries contributes to maintain the sense of ethnic affiliation (Gordon, 
2000: 314-315).  
Wodaabe Fulani live mainly in the southeastern side of Niger, bordering with 
Chad and Nigeria (see Fig. 2).  They are transhumant herders that live in mobile 
communities, whose size depends on the season, that cover the Sahelian range in a 
planned way.  This area is characterized by dry heat, and low rain rates, fluctuating 
from year to year.  The region soil is classified as sub-arid, not very fertile and with 
sparely distributed trees (Loftsdottir, 2001).   
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Fig. 2 
 Migrations, despite the existing certain household autonomy, are planned by a 
council of men of the community.  During the rainy season, from May to June, short-
distance mobility is constant and groups remain closer, whereas during the dry season 
they settle dispersedly next to wells and pastures closer to sedentary and agricultural 
populations, thereby reducing interactions within the community, and increasing them 
with members of other ethnic and social groups.  These interactions are significant for 
economic exchanges take place, mainly millet for milk, the two main tenets of 
Wodaabe nourishment (Loftsdottir, 2001; Schareika, 2010).   
3. 2 The cow and the milk 
The cow plays a central role not only in the economic life, but in the symbolic 
too.  Fulani herders society revolves around the cow and its needs, it is considered as 
a gift of God, therefore a relation of cooperation and reciprocity is established, taking 
care of each other (Loftsdottir, 2001).  The strong presence of the cow dates back to 
their origin myth: two siblings suddenly started to speak an unknown language, 
scared, their parents rejected them, the children wandered through the bush until they 
reached the shore of a lake where they lit a fire.  Cows started to emerge slowly from 
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the water, the children became herders and the cows their herd.  Isolated because of 
the language the two siblings ended up getting married.  Their offspring, the Fulani, 
inherited a herd and a language (Sow, 2006:1-2).   
The cow in Wodaabe Fulani society exemplifies the symbolic, social and 
economic role of the animals (Sow, 2006, 2005; Riesman, 1977; Loftsdottir, 2001).  
It provides milk and transforms shrubs for human production in the Sahelian 
environment.  Moreover, it is integrated and an active participant in the social system.  
They assist and attend to life transitions ceremonies like birth, death and marriage.  It 
is part of the habana’i, a system of distribution of cattle through loans and gifts that 
helps to reduce risks and inequalities within communities, and contributes to establish 
social relationships.  Woodabe Fulani raise, among others, a particular breed of cows, 
the Mbororo, linked to their identity as a group.  This cow is characterized by having 
a close bind to the breeder to whom it obeys and responds, but does not cooperate 
with strangers making them very difficult to steal.  The Mbororo are known for being 
independent and fierce, and are considered by the Woodabe as semi- domesticated 
animals, and having djikku or character, a quality that Fulani associate with humans.  
As it will broaden throughout the next sections, to lose self-control is considered as a 
negative quality in humans (Riesmann, 1977: 226), therefore to associate djikku to 
cows, conceived as animals with independent personalities, puts them at the same 
level than humans.  Another sign of the intimacy with the cow is that, in contrast to 
other animals, cows carry the same name as their mothers in a systematic way.  This 
matrilineal system creates a link of continuity with the past, since different animals 
carry the same name that their forebears’.  Thus the relation with the cow is not only 
based on reason and instrumental uses, but these are inseparably linked with emotions 
like affection.  Since the wellbeing of the cow implies the wellbeing of the people, the 
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relation established is not one of dominance but of reciprocity and equality.  Sibiiru is 
another practice that exemplifies the bond between people, land and cattle.  After a 
child is born, his/her umbilical cord is buried next to the wood pieces that hold the 
calf rope for milking.  This links birth to the land.  The twofold meaning of sibiiru, 
navel and umbilical cord, shows a sense of continuity, the nourishing bond is not cut 
after birth.  The fact of digging it in a symbolic place next to another rope which 
represents livestock and nourishment reinforces this sense of continuity associating 
the womb to cattle –their form of nourishment– , and to the land of origin.  As it will 
be argued in the following sections, cows play an important role in Wodabee 
conceptualization of the environment; they function as mediators between the bush 
and the village (Loftsdottir, 2001; Riesman, 1977).  What is nature and what is 
society is flexible for Wodabee, sometimes dichotomized, others not, and cows play a 
key role in it (Loftsdottir, 2001: 287-289).   
Milk is another fundamental element in Fulani society for nourishing, economic 
and symbolic reasons.  According to Fulani mythology, the universe created by 
Gueno sprang from a drop of milk containing the four cardinal points, and from it 
emerged an hermaphrodite bovine, symbol of the universe.  Gueno entrusted the 
cattle to Tyanaba, a mythical snake who took them out of the waters, from the ocean 
to the Débo Lake, assisted by a herder and his wife, Koumen and Foroforoundou.  
This couple was in charge of unveiling the initiatory secrets of shepherding to those 
who want to dedicate their lives to it (Ba and Dieterlen, 1961: 199).  Fulani 
descriptions of paradise portray a garden where rivers of milk flow, it is the reward of 
pure souls.  The religious component of milk appears in everyday practices, taboos, 
and ceremonies like baptism or marriage (Sow, 2005: 439).  
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Therefore, milk is one of the vital energies of the camp.  It has a strong identity 
component, almost narcissistic; it is offered and shared with any guest or member of 
the community as part of the pulaaku code of conduct to which I will refer later.  
Drinking it is associated with physical and moral wellbeing and beauty.   
Since cows are rarely sold and never sacrificed for intensive butchery or to feed 
the family, milk represents the main nourishing and economic source that the cattle 
provide (Sow, 2005: 425).  The two mentioned elements, the cow and the milk, 
determine the division of tasks within the family.  While men are in charge of the 
cattle management, surveillance and displacement, women’s tasks cover everything 
related to milk management: collection, transformation, commercialization, and 
medical and aesthetic uses.  “Milk belongs to women” (Sow, 2006: 4)1, says the 
Fulani proverb.  The role of women is important for the transmission of all the 
knowledges and practices related to these processes (Sow, 2006: 3).   
If the cow is considered as a gift of god, milk is the raison d’être of the Fulani 
herder.  When it is abundant, it is consumed in every meal as a drink or as the main 
ingredient of the dish.  Therefore, Fulani practices and knowledges revolve around 
obtaining milk, not only about obtaining quantity but also quality.  These entail the 
knowledge about the bush, selection and management of pastures, the caring and 
selection of the cattle, the production of a variety of products for different, and their 
storage, conservation and commercialization (Sow, 2005).   
Concerning the property of cattle, it belongs first to the family, and then, at a 
symbolic level, to the whole community.  Each member of the couple contributes to 
the family cattle with their own cows, and children receive a cow as a present when 
                                                          
1
 “Aux femmes appartient le lait” (my translation).  
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born or after certain initiatory rituals (Sow, 2006:3).  In spite of the autonomy and 
flexibility of the familial unit, Fulani herders tend to assemble in higher forms of 
social integration.   Cooperation is needed for migration, protection of the cattle, 
information sharing and efficient occupation of the pastureland, cohabitation and 
political alliances (Schreika, 2010:4).  This familial and individual autonomy, which 
suits more easily the transhumant lifestyle, is not at odds with a community sense.  
This is explained by  Eduard Spranger (1952, in Kockel, 2012: 61) with the 
ecologically based concept of individuality as “existential connectedness”, rather than 
to the egocentric and insular concept of individualism.  This point will be covered 
later in detail.  
Fulani lifestyle, like that of other transhumant people, has been labeled as 
stagnant and traditionalist, and their economy, precariously self-sufficient, 
contemplative and technically retarded (Puillon, 1990; Khazhanov, 2001).   This is, to 
certain extent, a paradox considering the mobility, dynamism, and the adaptive 
solutions found in face of the challenges of their political and environmental contexts.  
This discourse, recurrent among state officers and development agents, is rooted in 
the construction of the image of nomads as culturally isolated, archaic societies, to 
which coeval is denied (Fabian, 1983), and serves to legitimize paternalist, external 
development interventions in order to break with this archaic heritage (Pouillon, 
1990).  
François Pouillon (1990: 175) proposes to replace the triad isolation-
specialization-stagnation that sustains the afore-mentioned discourse, by another 
model based on flexibility-relation-multiple resources, which adjusts better to 
economic practices of Fulani herders.   For, all along history organic relations have 
been established with markets, neighboring agricultural communities, villages, and 
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states.  The author enhances (Pouillon, 1990: 176) that Fulani idiosyncrasy appears at 
its best when having to negotiate the validity of their strategies with forces that 
surpass them.   
Nevertheless, from a political ecology perspective, isolation would not be 
removed from the model but translated into marginalization, which may not be 
incompatible with relation, but derived from certain relations.  In other words, 
marginalization is produced by contact with dominant groups –in this case, colonial 
and postcolonial states, and international aid (Pouillon, 1990)–, making “otherwise 
environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to overexploitation 
of natural resources on which they depend” (Robbins, 2004: 159).  The author posits 
that this contact leads to the cycle of poverty and environmental degradation, which is 
often attributed to the practices (and ignorances) of traditional, subsistence 
communities (Robbins, 2004: 117, 159).  
Fulani mobility patterns are usually structured according to the season.  During 
the rainy season, the aim is to settle the camp next to a pond, and from there to seek 
for pasturelands in the nearby.  During the dry season the priority is to find water, so 
the cattle is drawn back next to agricultural communities where reciprocity relations, 
not exempt of tension, and economic exchanges are possible (Pouillo, 1990; Sow, 
2005; Loftsdottir, 2001).  
Pouillon (1999: 179-184) accounts how colonial administrators attempt to 
activate remote, unexploited pasturelands without permanent water ponds.  The 
exploitation of underground water would permit to nourish the cattle during the dry 
season and to settle and regroup herders within a specific land.  The aim was to solve 
a structural problem derived from the increasing space provided for agriculture, 
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reducing pastureland.  The initial success led to a reduction of mobility as expected, 
but at mid- term it brought a lot of imbalances that showed the inefficacy of the 
settlements provoked an increasing self-subsistence economy.  The contract between 
sedentary and nomadic populations was broken, interrupting the economic flow, and 
impending temporaries combination of agriculture and shepherding.  The 
characteristics of arid zones with low rains, unequal distribution of pasturelands and 
periodic droughts demand mobility along bigger areas.  Instead of concentration, 
colonial measures provoked the dissemination of Fulani herders.  To that it must be 
added that the appearance of new sicknesses stemming from underground waters 
reduced livestock and increased the dependency on veterinary.  Therefore, Fulani 
herders engaged in what they call perol, among the different word used to refer to 
mobility, this is associated to out of the ordinary migrations for adaptive purposes in 
case of political and ecological difficulties, being forced to abandon gari, or the area 
of attachment.   
 The postcolonial state and international development projects oriented to 
intensify production to strengthen and integrate Fulani herders into an expanding 
meat market – restructuring cattle breeding methods–   have sharpened Fulani 
strategies to respond and correct imbalances.  Pouillon (1990: 188-189) posits that 
Fulani logic concerning these proposals presented as progress does not fully respond 
to the dichotomy tradition/modernity, for there are as many convergences as 
divergences between Fulani societies and development actors.  
Due to the marginalization derived from the state policies and the periodic 
severe droughts which result in the loss of livestock, Fulani herders diversify their 
economic activities ranging from agriculture to urban migration in order to obtain 
income to reestablish the cattle.  Hence, Wodaabe migrate to big cities to engage 
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mainly in craft selling to tourists.  This has led to an increasing interest on Wodaabe 
people in the West, portraying them as a traditional, exotic people that live outside of 
history and time.  Therefore, relations with Westerns are framed within power 
imbalances.  Westerns, from their privileged position, seek authenticity in the 
increasing poverty of Fulani herders, whereas the latter resort to the commodification 
of their culture as a subsistence strategy (Loftsdottir, 2001: 11-13).  
3. 3 Pulaaku 
The person, Neddo, is thought to be composed by multiple persons, Neddaaku.  
According to Iba Fall (2010: 140-142), this reflects the different aspects of the 
container, Neddo, which veils more realities than what it shows.  It is not only through 
the social aspect the Neddo finds equilibrium, but through an inner work that orders, 
balances, and masters this concentric and superimposed inner multiplicity.  I will focus 
in this section on the social aspect of the Fulani person.  
Pulaaku is a moral code that guides Fulani conduct and interpersonal relations 
within a community of herders (Sow, 2006; Loftsdottir, 2001; Riesman, 1977).  
Amselle (1998: 44) posits these values are not exclusive to Fulani, since similar codes 
exist in neighboring societies.  The author’s assertion is with in line with his de-
constructive attempt of Fulani identity, the latter consider Pulaaku as one of their 
distinctive identity traits.  Whether distinctive or not, these shared values may explain 
why Pulaaku can be used, and accepted as a social institution that shapes relations 
with other ethnic and social groups outside of the community (Riesman, 1977).  
Paul Riesman (1977: 124) translates the term as  “the qualities appropriation to 
the Fulani” and also refers to it as the group of people possessing these qualities.  For 
 97 
 
Fulani linguist, Salamatou Sow (2006), it has the twofold meaning of moral code and 
community.  
Pulaaku entails conventional rules of politeness and the moral qualities of an 
ideal behavior in social life, whose central element is the mastery of needs, impulses 
and discomforts.  (Breedveld and De Bruijn, 1996: 802; Riesman, 1977).  This 
contributes to social cohesion since pulaaku does not emerge from the individual but 
on the necessary presence of others, who will examine the acts of the individual in the 
light of this ideal.  At the same time, not following pulaaku risks dismembering a 
group; an individual who lacks pulaaku is considered as not being who he/she claims 
to be, therefore it may become the object of criticism, ostracism or ridicule (Riesman, 
1977: 138).  
The moral aspect consists of four tenets: hakkillo, understood as wisdom, 
common sense, prudence; seemtende, shame, reserve, self-control; munyal, resilience, 
patience; and teddengal, respect.  This code of conduct is used for conflict resolution 
and mutual agreement since it allows to preserve the autonomy of the community by 
avoiding to resort to legal or political institutions (Schareika, 2010; Riesman, 1977; 
Breedveld and Mirjam De Bruijn, 1996).  
Pulaaku is the reference that frames the mediation and negotiation processes of 
two conflicting sides.  Pulaaku is used in political discourses and can shape political 
events depending on its strategic use.  This not only occurs by means of its moral 
values, but the term itself is appealed to as a rhetoric resource during negotiations.  Its 
conflict resolution significance is outlined when the situation of Fulani herders 
requires dealing with internal conflict without resorting to state authorities 
(Schareika, 2010).  
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Wodaabee political organization rests mainly on the leadership of male elders 
of every household, integrated in bigger social units, wuro which result from kinship, 
co-residence, joint migration, pastoral cooperation, political alliances and 
intermarriage.   These are ruled by a traditional leader, lamiido, who, in its turn, is 
subordinated to a traditional regional leader.  The state makes itself present in 
pastoral communities by means of the social association of the traditional regional 
leaders to state officers.  The former have a limited influence on daily economic, 
social and juridical life of wuro, being their function reduced to tax-collecting and “a 
generally accepted yet loose leadership role in lineage and clan affairs” (Schareika, 
2010: 209).  Wodaabee ,and other nomadic groups, reliance on the state is rare even 
when protection of the cattle or access to public wells is needed.  This is due to the 
reluctance and disdain of the state towards nomads, and the mistrust on the uncertain 
and arbitrary outcomes of state interventions.  (Schareika, 2010: 209-210).  
Nicholaus Schareika (2010: 215- 217) documents an episode of mediation by a 
Lamiido and the elders of two Wodaabee families in conflict because of a wife 
stealing accusation.  Right from the beginning of their statement the accusing party 
argued that pulaaku had been abandoned.  This implied that the agreement that the 
basic agreement had been broken and the doors were opened for the state laws 
intervention.   The consequences of this would result in the loss of autonomy of the 
community, and economic fines that had to be paid with cattle.  The speaker referred 
to the loss of the track of the cattle – one of the two images to evoke the pulaaku– to 
summarize the situation in the community.   
The intervention of the other conflicting part alluded to the other image of the 
pulaaku, the rope of the cattle, to present his view of the situation, arguing that the 
track had not been lost, but the rope had thinned.  In this way he turned the argument 
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of the other part maintaining pulaaku as a valid framework, and at the same time he 
touched the sensitive point of the inconvenience of community separation.  In that 
sense Schareika (2010: 216-217) posits,   
the duty of the assembled Wodaabe was to retie the rope of pulaaku, 
[which]  emerges when humans master conflicts by sticking to the 
personal virtue of pulaaku, which is self-control, reserve, and the 
ability to endure duress instead of seeking confrontation.  
At that point, the Lamiido called for the “shameful reserve” (Schareika, 2010: 
217) as the practical expression of Pulaaku and as a way of resolving the conflict by 
mutual agreement instead of retaliation or resorting to the law.  His speech condenses 
the core of the pulaaku as community and moral code (Schareika, 2010: 217): 
Community of Fulbe [Pulaaku], wherever you hear the word of 
pulaaku, does that mean that one seizes a person in order to give him 
a dressing-down? When Bammoowo [from the Muuse] slapped your 
son's face, Ardo Kaaďo [from the Jiijiiru], [and] you kept him away 
from retaliating the blow, did not Bammoowo feel ashamed? Didn't 
he do as one does when feeling ashamed? You see, this is pulaaku, 
only this.  When you hear "they mock at us, they do this or that 
against us, let's take them to court," then there is not a grain of 
pulaaku in that, or am I not telling the truth? When the bad talk 
makes enemies of you, then give it up.  This is pulaaku.  You 
understand? 
To show reserve to the culprit provokes his embarrassment and enhances his 
own previous abandonment of pulaaku.   Moreover, it reaffirms the moral code as an 
“alternative political order” (Schareika, 2010: 217) which maintains the autonomy 
and self-control of the community away from the state authorities.  For involving the 
state would imply the reduction of property in the community (cattle), and would 
define the frame for their future interactions.   
Ostracism is the sanction for the lack of pulaaku; the culprit is not expelled 
from the community but it is temporary excluded from social intercourse by not 
speaking to him.  The ceremony of reincorporation consists of asking for forgiveness 
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to the elders, and offering millet and milk to the community.  However, as in the case 
accounted here, this resource does not work when the conflicting parts represent a big 
number of the community.  In this case, the mention of the separation represents a 
first warning before adopting harsher measures in case of a recurrent abandon of 
pulaaku.  In light of the receding access to pastures the need for unity, not only within 
Wodaabe communities but with other nomadic herders, turns pulaaku into a political 
resistant resource in order to try to balance the weight of the state (Schareika, 2010: 
220-222).  
Another resource employed to relief tensions, mainly with members of other 
ethnic group, are the joking relationships (Riesman, 1977:124), consisting in 
bantering, cursing and teasing.  Cousinage à plaisanterie is a practice promoted by 
the Nigerien state, and celebrated as a cultural trait that fosters peaceful cohabitation 
between the different ethnic groups of the country (Barké, 2008).   This is related to 
what Gomes (2012: 1069) calls “sly civility” to refer to the “form of civility which 
conceals or evades the true feelings of a person to avoid reprisals, humiliation or 
oppression.” The author posits that the unequal status may determine the use of this 
strategy oriented to avoid a bigger conflict.  
 3. 4 The place where people sit down 
The relation of the Fulani herders with the environment is based on values of 
integration, respect and protection.  Mamadou Dia (1975; quoted in Fall, 2010: 41)
1
 
refers to it as a friendship relationship:  
                                                          
1
 “La nature, loin de s’opposer à l’homme, lui assure sa vie, son efficacité, sa protection.  Il suffit de ne 
pas la blesser, de respecter les liens qui l’unissent à l’homme (…).  Il n’est donc pas la question, dans le 
cadre de cette mentalité, d’une lutte entre la nature et l’homme, mais d’une communion constante, et 
tout l’activité de l’homme tend à maintenir cette harmonie dont la ruptura ne peut engendrer des 
catastrophes. ” (my translation) 
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“Nature, far from being the opposite of the human being, it assures 
its life, efficacy and protection.  It just requires not hurt it.  (…).  
Thereby, this relation does not consist of a struggle between humans 
and nature, but a constant communion; all human activity tends to 
maintain this harmony whose rupture can only engender 
catastrophes. ” 
This statement is in tune with Fulani oral tradition.   After the creation, whose myth 
was mentioned above, Gueno created Neddo, the human being, as a synthesis of all the 
elements of the universe, both positive and negative, without bestowing him/her the 
supremacy over the rest of the creation.  The only difference between humans and the 
rest is that Neddo was bestowed with a partial knowledge, not the totality of it, which 
gave him the competence and the mission to act as a caretaker of the universe.  
Therefore, the role of Neddo, was to protect and to manage nature (Amougou, 2007: 
11).  
The importance of a harmonic relation with each other and with nature is exemplified 
in Fulani mythology by the tale of the country of Heli et Yoyo: an idyllic place created 
by Gueno where harmony, happiness, life and abundance reigned, and where humans 
were supposed to be the caretakers of nature.  This contract between Gueno and Neddo 
which allowed them to obtain from nature what was strictly necessary was broken when 
the inhabitants of the country started to abuse of nature and to behave greedily to each 
other.  Njeddo Dewal, the sorcerer who brought sickness, poverty, natural catastrophes, 
and death of animals, represents the disruption of the interdependence and natural 
harmony caused by humans.  The arrival of Bâ Wam’ndé, personifying the initial moral 
virtues of humans, helped to reestablish the contract (Amougou, 2007:12-13).  Thus, in 
Fulani traditional thought the relation between humans and nature is of interdependence 
and respect, and the knowledge of humans is at the service of a harmonious and 
balanced relation with the environment.  
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On a physical level, the conceptualization of the environment and the relation with it 
is a core element of Fulani sense of identity.  Although expressed in seemingly 
contradictory ways, their conceptualization of the environment is complex and 
contextual.  In the context of their relations with sedentary populations, Wodaabee 
Fulani called themselves “people of the bush” outlining their social and economic links 
with the environment and considering the town and the bush as oppositions, positioning 
themselves as part of the bush (Loftsdottir, 2001: 281).  However, within the context of 
the bush and the animals, they see themselves as separated from nature, differentiating 
between the non-socialized and socialized space, ladde (bush) and wuro respectively, 
the latter translated as home (Loftsdottir, 2001), or community (Riesman, 1977).  
 Wuro, as it was stated earlier, is not merely a house, but a temporary assembly of 
social and political mobile organizations joined by kinship, political and neighborhood 
ties (Riesman, 1977: 30).  From the perspective of  wuro, Wodaabe place themselves as 
a part of the bush, although differentiated from the rest of the surrounding bush.  Wuro 
is a place of safety and cooperation in contrast to ladde.  There are several different 
concepts of ladde according to level of intimate knowledge that people has of it.  Ladde 
wati is an overpopulated bush, with agricultural fields, no wild animals, and cut down 
trees.  In contrast, ladde hurram is a space without human population, wells or water 
ponds (Loftsdottir, 2001: 285).  This is considered unsafe and dangerous, and occupied 
by ginnol, evil spirits, that stay away from wuro and normally appear when travelling 
alone in the bush.  Thus, ginnol functions as a cohesive element and outlines the 
importance of social networking, since ginnol can affect wuro as a “moral reminder of 
solidarity” (Loftsdottir, 2001: 292), when a wealthy herder does not engage in habana’i, 
or cattle distribution practices.   
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Thus, the more intimate the knowledge of ladde, the more secure it becomes.  In that 
sense, the cow, considered a semi-domesticated animal, is believed to be sensitive to 
both the bush and the herder; therefore it plays the roles of mediators between ladde and 
wuro, to turn the space into place (Riesman, 1977: 255).  
When herders enter the bush to take care of the cow, new and different relationships 
with nature are established.  Concerning land utilization, migrations, and resource 
management, Fulani use the concept gari, underlining human settlements integrated in 
the bush.  Gari shares with wuro similar connotations of safety, coexistence, reciprocity 
and cooperation.  This is reinforced mainly during the dry season, when camps are 
separated by bigger distances, settled around a pastureland with permanent wells, and 
coexisting with other social groups increases, this “area of attachment” or gari, is 
referred to by Fulani as “the place where people sit down” (Lofstsottir, 2001:  285).   
What I want to outline from this account is not the connection of place with Fulani 
identity, or their position towards a nature/society distinction, but the cultural 
connections with place and the environment, which are embedded in their knowledge 
and their practices, and has significant implications at different levels (Kockel, 2012; 
Basso, 1996; Ingold, 2011).  
For Keith Basso (1996: xiv), senses of place reach deep other cultural spheres since 
they are an active part of “shared bodies of local knowledge”.  Thereby gari, wuro and 
ladde as deep involvements with social and the natural environment are practices that 
construct knowledge out of the combination of the ecologic, the economic, the social 
and the spiritual.  These experiences apprehend the world by actively sensing a place 
through dwelling, through “lived relationships” (Basso, 1996: 106) with and within the 
place.  Fulani knowledge suits what Ingold (2000: 25) calls sentient ecology: 
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(…) the kind of knowledge people have of their environments (…).  It 
is knowledge not of a formal, authorized kind, transmissible in contexts 
outside those of its practical application.  On the contrary, it is based in 
feeling, consisting in the skills, sensitivities and orientations that have 
developed through long experience of conducting one’s life in a 
particular environment.   
Ingold (2011: 158-161) distinguishes between the genealogical model and the 
storied model of knowledge transmission.  The former goes together with the 
transmission of a conceptual and explicative knowledge that vertically places 
elements on slots regardless of their context, relations, precedents or continuations, 
since these are not necessary to know what things are.   The latter departs from these 
relations to identify and position the elements, “stories (…) draw together what 
classifications split apart” (Ingold, 2011: 160), it involves a finer sensitivity to 
perceive and respond to signs in the environment.  Sentience ecology and the storied 
model go hand in hand with what the author calls an “ontology of dwelling” (Ingold, 
2000: 42), referred to in the previous chapter,  a way of apprehending the world out 
of engagement rather than building and representation.  Ingold (2011: 162) 
concludes: 
Thus knowing is relating the world around you, and the better you 
know, the greater the clarity and depth of your perception.  To tell, in 
short, is not to represent the world but to trace a path through it that 
others can follow.  
“Wisdom sits in places places”, assert the Apache  (Basso, 1996: 124).  Similar 
concerns to the concepts of wuro, ladde and gari as  active relations to places of 
belonging through dwelling and deep knowledge of them, are expressed, among others, 
in the German speaking tradition by the controversial concepts Heimat and 
Heimatkunde, which scholars (Kockel, 2012; Daum, 2007) call to revisit and reclaim.   
Nineteenth century Heimatkunde was based on Volkskunde –a German discipline 
focused on the study of people and traditions– and included on school curricula as the 
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sensory and experiential study and appreciation of Heimat – “the place where we come 
from” (Kockel, 2012: 59) –within a larger world, by moving from the familiar to the 
unfamiliar (Kockel, 2012, 2010).  Its ideological use by romantic regionalists first, and 
the misappropriation by Nazis later, led to a vilification of the concept, and its 
association with parochialism, territorialism and intolerance.  Hence its consequent 
replacement after WWII as a school subject first by Sachkunde (knowledge of things) 
material oriented and with a cosmopolitan approach, and later by the more objectifying 
and detached Umweltkunde, the study of the environment (Kockel, 2009).  
Ullrich Kockel (2012: 57) draws on the work of philosopher Eduard Spranger to 
propose a revision of Heimat that fosters a better understanding of the self and the other 
by considering them all as a part of a common local household, which expands the 
concept of Heimat to the place where we are from or towards.  Hence, Heitmakunde is 
defined as  
 
the careful appreciation of the connectedness of human beings in all 
their natural and spiritual life-relationships with a particular place on 
earth, which is their native place or at least a place of permanent 
dwelling (Kockel, 2012: 59).  
Spranger (1952; in Kockel, 2012: 59-60) outlines the grounded sense of Heimat, and 
the deep experiential connections of oneself with the elements of the place, human, non-
human, past, present and future, needed to develop it.  This is not necessarily created by 
being born in a place, but by “living oneself into a place” (Kockel, 2010: 105), either of 
birth or far away from it.   
 To the above stated criticism received by this position for its similitudes with Nazi 
terminology and its emphasis on the local and the connectivity, it must be added that 
ecological basis of it was considered as an eccentric obstacle to progress in post-war 
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Germany (Daum, 2007; Kockel, 2012).  Thus, departing from Spranger, Kockel argues 
that a reestablishment of Heimat is needed, beyond  parochial, melancholic and 
romanticized stances, since globalization and environmental crisis affect the material 
and spiritual aspects of place, leading to is disappearance, turning Heimat into an 
abstraction rather than an experience (Kockel, 2012; 62).   
The author introduces a related German concept, Hiesige, “from-here-ness” (Kockel, 
2012: 62), to distinguish it from being native.  Hiesige is about the encompassing 
encounter of the self and the other rather.  Constructing Heimat leads to become Hiesig, 
from here, a comprehensive, inclusive and ecologically grounded anchor which differs 
from being native in that the latter does not necessarily entail “the recognition of 
concrete cultural-ecological networks and their everyday actuality” (Kockel, 2009: 152) 
of the experience of Heimat.  Therefore, being from here is not so much about 
nationality, ethnicity or religion, but about being defined in active relation to a 
particular place of dwelling which may even include movement” (Kockel, 2012: 66; 
italics in the original).  This movement from A to B, in the light of being from here, 
becomes being now here, not understood as detachment and displacement, unconcerned 
by the connectedness of the individual with the past left behind in A for a indeterminate 
future in B, discarding both.  It is not about “seeking out the next horizon, finding Eden 
in some other locale and ultimately in glory above” (Kockel, 2010: 166).  
Being now here is regarded as homecoming, a circular cyclical movement, which 
“grounds the now deeply in the past and future; it is about at-tachment and re-
placement” (Kockel, 2012: 65; italics in the original).  It is understood as turning the 
world into Heimat by achieving “a very clear intuition of what it means to live with 
integrity right where they are” (Kockel, 2010: 166).  Thereby, Heimatkunde proposes a 
different view of the world by “investing a particular world version with patterns of 
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meaning generating authentic belonging” (Kockel, 2010: 166) that aspires to create a 
sense of community which departures and goes beyond the individual.  
Heimatkunde, is based on three main premises, (i) the world is an organic whole, our 
knowledge of the world is also organic and interconnected, (iii) the human being is a 
part “of these organic relationships of life and truth” (Kockel, 2012: 68).  The author 
(Kockel, 2012: 68) contends that connectedness has been widely discussed in and 
outside academia, therefore, his ecological reading of Spranger puts the emphasis on the 
engagement with truth and the sacred.   Truth, in German, Wahrheit, coming from 
wahren, meaning to keep safe, to preserve, is hence understood “as a function of 
ecological relationships” (Kockel, 2012: 68).  
A third element I would like to bring into this discussion aimed at establishing 
cultural homologies is the Aymara cosmology as expressed in the thought of 
Argentinian philosopher and ethnographer Rodolfo Kusch.  
 Kusch’s work with Andean indigenous populations as well as with peasants, workers 
and mestizo populations from rural areas of Bolivia and Argentina seeks not a 
“scientific exhumation” of people’s thought, but to “ reinscribe and rescue” (Mignolo, 
2010:  xxxiv; italics in the original) a way of thinking, and to think from it, not about it.  
His rejection of a scientific approach is understood as a de-colonizing act towards the 
emancipation of being and knowing.  This could not be accomplished if these people 
had to be “authorized by Western epistemology as something to be studied” rather than 
being considered as “a source, an energy, and a way of thinking” (Mignolo, 2010: 
xxxiv).  Therefore Kusch distances himself from disciplinary categories of thought and 
social sciences descriptions that were shaped and gave shape to the imperial and 
colonial world.  His personal ethnographic method aims not to represent, translate or 
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reinterpret indigenous thought, positioning them as objects to be ethnographically 
explained, but to accompany this thought by attempting “to dwell on the questions, 
paths and possibilities” (Lugones and Price, 2010: lxvii) of the Andean cosmos.  The 
author does not attempt to contribute to abstract knowledge either, since this knowledge 
is at the same time a way of thinking, being, feeling, and living engaged with the 
material world which shape their everyday practices (Mignolo, 2010; Lugones and 
Price, 2010; Kusch, 2010).  
An aspect I do not share with Kusch’s work is his attempt to present it as a radical 
rupture with Western tradition by seeking for a differentiated thought rooted deeply in, a 
silenced part of what he calls, América, posited as completely antagonist to a monolithic 
West (Kusch, 2010: lxxiii).  Although my intention is far away from denying the 
subaltern position, the resistant character, and the emancipatory potential of indigenous 
and Andean populations thought in relation to the imposition of Western epistemes –as 
it was covered in the first chapter of the thesis–, Kusch’s epistemic de-linking approach, 
in line with other Latin American authors –also mentioned in chapter one – may not be 
in tune with the spirit of this thesis.   Notwithstanding, Kusch’s (2010) explicit aim does 
not impend that aspects of his work can be profitable for this chapter and used in a more 
conducive to dialogue manner.  For the aim of this thesis is to look for shared concerns, 
commonalities, and legibilities, basically to try to gather together  rather than to disjoint 
silenced epistemologies, and these can be found in the West too, as in the case of 
Heimatkunde.  
For the topic that concerns this section, I am going to focus on a central aspect of 
Kusch’s work, the notion of estar in opposition to ser as  two “irreconcilable ways of 
situating oneself in the world” (Lugones and Price, 2010: lv).  Both Spanish verbs can 
be translated in English as the verb to be.  Ser comes from the Latin sedere, to be sitting 
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down, and it is used to define and to attribute essences and fixed qualities, in a 
subordinated relation to the subject, that set the basis to define it.  Estar, from the Latin 
stare, to stand up, does not convey inherent qualities of the subject, it informs about 
place, duration, mood or purpose.  It has a transitory and restless character that does not 
change the subject.  Estar “points directly to the world” (Kusch, 2010: 159), the 
conditions, circumstances or accidents in which the subject is immersed (Kusch, 2010: 
159; Von Matushcka, 1994).  
For Kusch (2010), Aymara verb utcatha characterizes indigenous sensibility, which is 
closer to estar.  Utcathata means estar, and also, and paradoxically, to be sitting down, 
and to dwell.  The root Uta meaning house is also associated to womb, shelter and 
germination (Kusch, 2010: 5).  It indicates passivity, understood as the lack of one 
particular kind of activity: enterprise.  It is a non-instrumental approach to the world, 
rather than objectifying and controlling it as a separate external reality.  “Estar (…) 
situates one within the world, where one senses its volatility, its mutability, its 
instability, its bearing fruit” (Lugones, 2010: lvi).   
Instability is a key notion in Aymara conception of the world.  Kuty or vuelco 
designates the possibility of a turn, “from the auspicious to the inauspicious” (Kusch, 
2010: 44), which is always present, hence for the subject to estar bien (estar well) 
he/she must be embedded in a community, plaza, nayru or amu, that is, a “place of 
equilibrium in an unstable world” (Lugones, 2010: lvii).   This communal sense 
balances and compensates a instability that cannot completely disappear.  The link 
subject-community-world is inseparable for Aymara.  Their conception of cosmos 
oscillates between two extremes, growth and disintegration.  This alternation is 
perceived by the individual by affectively sensing the “favorable or unfavorable tonality 
(…) of this movement” (Kusch, 2010: 41), derived from the inseparability of the 
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individual from the world, rather than from an external understanding of the world.  
The relation of the person to the community and the world has to be dealt at an 
individual level too.  Therefore, uk’u, human interiority, “is an opening to affectivity” 
(Lugones, 2010: lvii), the place to look for solutions to these unfavorable turns without 
resorting to external interventions.  Hence, Utcathata is dwelling among these cosmic 
elements, some of which are hostile forces, in the search of stability.  The response to 
hostility, instead of action, lies in identification with the environment, with the habitat 
of the here and now (pacha), with the communal (Lugones, 2010; Kusch, 2010).  Mere 
estar is a vegetal quality, it implies a way of installing oneself in life, an inner 
movement that uproots from the ground and inserts the individual in a reality (Von 
Matuschka, 1994: 142-143).   
Thus the possibility of kuty, the overturn, is integrated in utcathata, hence its meaning 
of seed and source.  Ritual’s role is to germinate the seed of life by entering into 
oneself, inhabiting and contemplating the world from there (Lugones, 2010: liv).  The 
Aymara  cosmos, consists of two levels, the guauque or the visible, nameable, and 
tactile, and the unnamable.  Both levels are inseparable dimensions of the concrete 
Estar, which, in a dialectic manner, results in a third one, guaque which is a “visible 
presence of the divine, the tactile, physical plane of the sacred object” (Lugones, 2010: 
liv).  Utcathata is to inhabit at the intersection of the guauque, and at the same time, 
inwardly accessing to the other levels through the knowledge of ritual that gives “the 
community its possibility of pulling toward germination, life, metamorphosis” 
(Lugones, 2010: lv).  Estar places oneself at the intersection of the visual horizon of 
things and a vertical line of mystery.  From this balancing of the cosmos springs the 
constant re-creation of community by ritual, and at the same time, the possibility of 
estar bien through estar con (estar with), that is, through community and solidarity.  
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This does not occur at the level of abstraction, but at the level of practices that 
determine everyday life activities (Lugone, 2010; Kusch, 2010: 164).  
Kusch (2010: 9- 16)  accounts of an episode during a visit to a village, when some of 
his students proposed an Aymara old man to install a hydraulic bump in order to better 
irrigate the dry fields of the Andean plateau.  The old man withdrew into himself and 
became more silent and distant.  His son, to relief the uncomfortableness of the silence, 
reluctantly affirmed that they were already thinking about it.  After that, the silence 
continued and they left.  For Kusch, his students (and himself) represent the ser 
understanding of the world.  To look for the solution in the outside means to conceive 
reality as populated by obejcts, etymologically from ob-jacio, to place in front (Kusch, 
2010: 11).   
 For the old man, the pump had no meaning since he relied on his own resources and 
rituals to balance the situation, rather than to force an external intervention in order to 
“enter reality impetuously, (…) to foreground the will in his sense of life” (Kusch, 
2010: 12).  This reality is conceived not as composed by fixed objects, but by intense 
movements, which need to be affectively sensed in order to respond to “the auspicious 
or ominous sign of each and every movement” (Kusch, 2010:11).  This is regarded as 
ignorance and passivity from the perspective of the city dweller and their understanding 
of life based on ser alguien (to be someone) characterized by modifying an external 
reality based on the logic of causes and effects.  Hence, Kusch (2010) reflects on the 
sense of alienation and dispossession of the city dweller in América  in its rejection of 
the logic of the mere estar, since for the author, to be able to ser it is first necessary to 
estar, to dwell, to be rooted in a environment, to inhabit with others.  
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 The aim of this section was to present neglected forms knowledge and existing with 
similar concerns as a step for a further search of commonalities and differences that 
allow to creatively work together against these common threats.  From the three onto-
epistemologies presented, the focus has been put on the relations of the individual and 
the community with the environment, and the importance of the connection with place, 
rather than space, and the multiple relationships that from there emerge, in order to 
situate oneself in the world.   Martínez Guzmán (2005: 38) outlines the importance of 
place in contrast to the abstract and homogenizing space, since the former allows 
empowerment and recognition of the different identities and the implications derived 
from them.  The three cases covered enhance the deep knowledge of the environment 
and the sense of belonging as embedded with different aspects of life, since it pervades 
personal economic, spiritual, and ecological relations.  This knowledge is not 
instrumental, classificatory and objectifying, but experiential, sensitive and affective; 
they enhance the role of the sacred through bodily and material spirituality that 
reconnects with nature.  As Kusch and Kockel in this section, other authors (Williams, 
Roberts, and McIntosh, 2012) warn against the sense of alienation, dispossession and 
dislocation of the contemporary human condition amidst ecological and economic 
current threats.   
Without ignoring the social, political, economic and environmental contextual factors 
that determine these conceptions and practices, to draw practical lessons from them it 
would be more appropriate to look at the ideals and values and values that sustain them 
(Gomes, 2012: 1070).  
A main difference between these perspectives is the role of the individual in forming 
a community.  For Heimatkunde it is the individual who makes the community –
although distinguishing between individuality and individualism–, in the case of Fulani 
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and Aymara is the other way round.  In these two cases, the role of the unknown, ladde 
for Fulani, and the possibility of kuty for Aymara, and their association with insecurity 
play a different role than the concept of Fremde in contrast to Heimat.  For Fulani and 
Aymara, the unknown and the accident are an integral part of a symbiotic relation with 
the environment, and it is this deep sensitive knowledge and the practices derived from 
it that contribute to reduce unsafety and imbalance, although acknowledging the 
impossibility of a complete overcome.   
From a more anthropocentric stance, Martínez Guzmán (2005: 18) reflects on the 
need to recognize the fragility, humility and earthly nature of the human being in 
opposition to the self-sufficiency of Western approaches to life.   For the author, from 
the awareness of the fragility of human relations, understood as “the difficulty to foresee 
the result of what we do to one another” (Martínez Guzmán, 2005: 28), can spring 
cooperation and reciprocity which leads into politics rather than into violence.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present several aspects of Fulani nomadic 
herders knowledge and conceptions of existence in relation with the environment.  
These show the importance of the cattle, not only as an economic resource, but also 
reveal an affective relation with it.  The cow shapes and participates actively or 
symbolically different social practices.  It is embedded in their moral code, social 
organization, ritual practices and in their sensitive and ecological understanding of 
the environment.  In their oral texts this is conceived as something to be respected 
and preserved, which is reflected in respectful and efficient resource management 
practices.  
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 Despite the mobility of Fulani herders lifestyle, the sense of belonging to the 
land is established through rituals, sensitive knowledge of it, and the intermediary 
role of the cattle who contributes to turn the space, which reflects the unknown, the 
unsafe, the fragility of human condition, into a place of cohabitation, cooperation 
with ecologically sensitive attitude towards it.   
Similar concerns regarding the sense of belonging, the importance of place, and 
a deep sensuous knowledge of the environment are present in other traditions, as it 
has been shown in this chapter with the comparative examples of Aymara cosmology 
from Rodolfo Kusch’s work, and in the German Heimatkunde.  These concerns are 
neither alien to peace studies as it is revealed in some aspects of the work of Martínez 
Guzmán (2005) which enhance the importance of place, the need to recognize 
fragility, and in the ecological dimension of his peace philosophy which departs from 
an earthly understanding of human beings.   
The parallelism that derives from these epistemological homologies opens the 
door for further understandings of traditions whose beliefs, values and practices 
creatively coexist, with the tensions that it implies, with the alienating, individualist, 
and the linear logic of growth of development and neoliberal epistemes.  It is through 
these resistant and neglected practices and values that lessons can be drawn in the 
need to face common threats.  
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General Conclusions 
“Nada más hago 
que escucharte y 
atender. Estoy 
preparado para 
no sé qué.” 
(Antonio Rigo, 2014) 
This research departed from two main premises. On one side, from the spirit of 
the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace in its commitment to relieve the 
suffering in the between humans and with nature, and, on the other side, from De 
Sousa Santos’ (2007b) tenet that there is no social justice without cognitive justice.  
In other words, this thesis departed from the premise that unequal epistemic 
relations, namely the hegemonic position of modern science, undergird economic, 
social, political and ecologic relations between humans and with nature, discarding 
certain groups of people from experiencing the world on their own terms. 
Furthermore, the consequent impoverishment of the diversity of conceptions, 
knowledges and practices by dominant narratives of modernity has deprived the 
world from the creative responses through which these groups of people face 
economic, social and ecologic threats that, without ignoring contextual, specific 
differences and privilege positions, are shared by humanity.  
Whence, the general objective of this thesis was to inquire on the relation of 
peace studies with other forms of producing knowledge. Therefore three specific 
objectives were established:  
1) To analyze how epistemological and ontological diversity has been dealt in 
peace Studies.  
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2) To situate, problematize and promote the debate on the unequal relations 
between different forms of knowledge within the frame of the UNESCO Chair 
of Philosophy for Peace and peace studies in general.   
3) To explore how peace studies can engage in equal dialogues with other 
understandings of peace beyond the dominant scientific paradigm  
To achieve these main objectives, I organized this work in three chapters which 
I proceed to summarize.  
The first chapter, which served as a theoretical framework, explored the  
processes that conduced to the reification of modern scientific rationality. The first 
section presented modern Western rationality as departing from the contributions of 
Descartes, Newton, Hobbes and Bacon.  Following what Apfel-Marglin (1996) called 
“the ontological cleft”, it was argued that the work of these authors led to othering of 
nature as a step before the t othering of humans and cultures during colonialism and 
imperialism. Cartesian distinctions of body and mind, reason and matter was 
expressed mathematically by Newton mechanistic formulation of the universe, 
together with Bacon’s methodological proposal set the foundations for the detached, 
value-free and rigorous model of natural sciences, which in its turn, was followed by 
social sciences. 
In the second section I contended, following post-colonial scholars such as 
Enrique Dussel (2000), that this dominant Eurocentered narrative of modernity 
should not be delinked from the economic, political and military processes and events 
of colonialism. Therefore, the rupture of modernity through reason and rationality had 
its counterpoint in the colonies by means of violence. Thus it is through irrationality 
and violence that a constructed and Europe situated itself in a centered explicative 
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position and scientific reason sustained its claims for universality. The modern 
dichotomies that separated subject and object, mind and body, man from the rest, 
what Santiago Castro-Gomes (Mignolo, 2009: 1) called “the hubris of the zero-
point”, were narrowed down to separate hierarchically the European, white male from 
the rest.  
Hence, from the epistemological and ontological superiority of the white male 
emerged the figure of the other, the savage, who had to be liberated by means of 
civilization, evangelization, modernization, and now development.  Thereof, I drew 
on the terms worlding and epistemic violence from Gayatri Spivak (1988) to refer to 
the construction of the other by processes through which European morals, religion, 
time, knowledge, history and institutions became the reference and the authority, and 
were inscribed onto a world conceived as an empty space. 
In disagreement with certain scholars (Nandy, 1998; Shiva, 1998; Castro-Gómez; 
2000) that enhance the inherent violence of modern science. I relied on other thinkers 
(Santos, 2007c; Mudimbe, 1998; Stoler, 2008; Grovogui, 2006) who contend that it 
was in conjunction with the dominant ideology of the society that scientific 
disciplines like history, anthropology, biology or linguistics – sheltered behind the 
supposedly detached, rigorous and value-free approach–, set the basis for the colonial 
and imperialist projects. The consequence of this was the reordering, reshaping and 
reinforcement of previous constructions representation of other cultures, assigning 
them their place in civilization. 
If the second section covered the “conditions of possibility” (Mudimbe, 1988) 
that led to the reification of modern scientific rationality, the next section dealt with  
the reconstructive attempts to subvert this unequal relation. I focused on two authors, 
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namely Walter Mignolo, and De Sousa Santos. Mignolo (2003, 2009), departs from 
the coloniality of power of Anibal Quijano (2000) to propose an epistemic rupture, 
de-linking from Western knowledge. In that sense I argued, relying on Santos (2007a) 
and McLennam (2013), that his proposal was based on geographic determinism, 
moreover the rupturist character was in itself a modern deflection.  
Santos (2007a; 2007b; 2010) argues that colonial arrogance has not only 
imposed science as the valid form of knowledge with the consequent impoverishment 
of the lives of the colonized, but it has also impeded the West to learn from other 
traditions. The author proposes to de-monumentalize modern science and critical 
theory by outlining its exhaustion and its loss of contact with reality. In a few 
sentences, he proposes to identify forms of knowledge and experiencing reality that 
have been silenced, to include modern science in a broader context as a part of a non-
hierarchical ecology of knowledges, and to engage in dialogic translations – where 
the West does not set the premises and the terms of the discussion– between resistant 
forms of knowledge that share similar concerns. 
In the last section of this chapter I finally attempted to situate the UNESCO 
Chair of Philosophy for Peace within the debate. Martínez Guzmán (2001) talks about 
peace in plural. In his epistemological shift, the author proposes a revision of the 
epistemological statute of the discipline not by taking modern science as the 
reference,  but, “on the contrary, (…) [by] question[ing] the capacities or 
competences that we human beings have in order to be able to affirm that we have 
competencies or capabilities to make peace” (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 39). The 
proposed paradigm consists of fifteen tenets which mainly deal with the inner limits 
of science. The most relevant for this thesis is his position towards including “the 
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outlook of the "people from the South” (Martínez Guzmán, 2009: 34), and his 
commitment to reconstruct vernacular knowledges. 
 Regarding interculturality, the author (Martínez Guzmán, 2009) warns against 
the risk of assimilation of human diversity by dominant Western assumptions and 
values, and calls for an intercultural perspective –beyond the mere acknowledgment 
of plurality– which can enrich and put into question our assumptions. To that effect, 
Martínez Guzmán contends that a dialogic approach is needed that allows us to be 
critical with ourselves and learn from others.  
The second chapter took as a reference Martínez Guzmán’s above-mentioned 
considerations, to analyze four case studies of how the intercultural approach has 
been dealt in  peace studies. To this effect, the concept “categorical violence” 
employed by James C. Scott (1998) turned to be a useful tool. Scott analyzes the 
simplification processes by which the modern state facilitate its functions by making 
a complex reality legible, and thereby measure, categorize, compare, manipulate and 
remake reality. As the author indicates, this could also be applied to certain 
reductionist approaches of modern science. To that, it was added the theoretical 
framework established in the first chapter, and the contributions of scholars like 
Edward Said (1978), Vandana Shiva (1988) and anthropologists such as Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro (2010), Tim Ingold (2000) and Alberto Gomes (2012). 
The first section covered the treatment of interculturality in two Wolfgang 
Dietrich (2012, 2013) works. From “Interpretations of Peace in History and Culture” 
(2012), the focus was put on the author’s five categories of peace which served him 
to classify the different understanding of peace throughout time and cultures and his 
transrational peaces approach. The transrational proposal draws on the four previous 
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categories in order to put forward a complete twisting of modern and postmodern 
understandings of peace by incorporating aspects from the energetic and moral 
categories of peace. I contended that in the whole theoretical framework, and 
concretely in the concept of transrationality, a Eurocentric stance pervades. This 
concept takes the part for the whole by assuming the existence of a single rationality, 
which is Western. This does not differ from the colonial logic. Whereas, derived from 
the reductionist approach that assimilates other rationalities into peace, these are 
narrowed down to the energetic, moral, spiritual, holistic, organic or relational, which 
are only aspects of them.  
From the work “Elicitive conflict Transformation and the Transrational Shift in 
Peace Politics” (Dietrich, 2013), I focused my analysis in the categorization of 
shamanism as a breath-oriented method for elicitive conflict transformation. 
Following Viveiros de Castro (2010), I have argued that, besides the peace and the 
healing (not only understood as Western medicine) shamanic practices, the shaman 
carries out different functions in the society which functions are linked to specific 
epistemological and ontological approaches. Therefore to associate shamanism as 
elicitive conflict transformation by only looking at it from a peace angle, veils the 
shaman’s “ontological self-determination”. Moreover, a romanticized view of the 
shaman was detected by Dietrich’s drawing on core-shamanism, an adaptation of 
shamanic practices to a Western audience, widely criticized by anthropologists 
(Wallis, 2003) for misappropriation and romaticization of indigenous knowledges. I 
concluded that the passive portrayal of interculturality in both works analyzed here 
obeys to what Donna Haraway (1989; as quoted in Lohman, 1993) called a 
“cannibalistic logic” that uses other cultures for Western purposes.  
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The second section covered the hermeneutic work of Johan Galtung (1981, 
1985, 1996) on the different concepts of peace across different civilizations. 
Previously, the author’s epistemological proposal for peace studies was briefly 
presented. In contrast to his own epistemological formulation, Galtung positioned 
himself as an external observer in order to establish a taxonomic classification of 
cultures on the basis of isolating certain essential defining features of these cultures 
and ignoring others. This is reflected by the division he establishes of the world 
according to their understanding of peace, the occident and the orient. Following 
Edward Said I contend that this classification, that juxtaposes religions, periods of 
time, currents of thought, states and empires, borders essentialism. I put forward, 
sustained by the arguments of Peter Lawler (1995) and Edward Said (1978), that 
Galtung conveyed a simplified, objectified, and sometimes Orientalist, view of 
cultures through their reduction to their concepts of peace.  
 Finally his reading of peace in Buddhism (Galtung, 1985b, 1996) is briefly 
analyzed. He equates Buddhist concepts such as dukkha and sukha to his positive and 
negative peace concepts, and the concept of Nirvana to entropy, and therefore to 
peace. According to ancient Indian philosophers Chandrakirti and Nagarjuna, quoted 
in (Yadav, 1977), defining Nirvana betrays the logic of the concept itself which 
entails a rejection of the is/is-not type of thinking. Following Ramachandra Guha 
(1989: 94), I argued that coupling peace studies with ancient Eastern traditions might 
respond to the attempt to universalize and to “construct an authentic lineage” of the 
discipline. 
The third section covered the work of Douglas P. Fry (2005, 2007, 2013) which 
revolves around indigenous forms of peace, and the inherently peaceful nature of the 
human being. After having situated the author’s work methodologically and 
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epistemologically in the positivist tradition, I focused on his ethnographic research on 
peacebuilding in La Paz, a Zapotec community. Following James Scott (1998) I 
contended that the author makes Zapotec complex reality legible by isolating a series 
of categories which, in his opinion, lead to the study of peace in that community. This 
approach, for Vandana Shiva (1988), implies a threefold exclusion: epistemological, 
ontological and sociological. Moreover, sustained by the work of anthropologists 
Ingold (2000) and Viveiros de Castro (2010), I posited that the authors’ psychological 
reading of Zapotec beliefs on witchcraft and illnesses such as susto and bilis, 
separating interior mental states from external behaviors, responds to his own 
ontological and epistemological certainties and assumptions rather than to Zapotec 
experience of the world. These are positioned as a “theoretical patient” (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2010: 70) rather than as agents;  thereby reducing their cosmology and 
“ontological self-determination” (Viveiros de Castro, 2010: 18).  
Finally I proceeded to analyze Fry’s (2013) study of nomadic forager societies, 
which is carried out in a similar vein as the  Zapotec. The author expresses his interest 
on these groups since they allow “to draw inferences about the past” (Fry, 2013: 9) 
concerning the peaceful nature of human being. My main argument in that sense is 
based on what Johannes Fabian (1983) called “the denial of coevalness”, by which 
the scientific imposes his own linear and evolutionist view of Time and treats the 
object of study as a contemporary relic.  
The last section covered the work of the organization Peaceful Societies and the 
online Encyclopedia of Peaceful Societies, available at the website  
www.peacefulsocieties.org. Before delving into the study case I presented the 
methodological requirements and the criteria of inclusion in order for a society to be 
labelled as peaceful. I argued that both, the criteria of inclusion and the concept of 
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peaceful societies itself, are exclusionary. The former for it reasserts the hegemonic 
position of science as the valid form of knowledge. My position concerning the latter 
was that, following Guha (1989) and Said (1978), the concept of peaceful societies is 
a positivist category that creates a romanticized and positive ‘Other’ by means of the 
abstraction of certain features that reveal a peaceful essence. 
Thereon, I analyzed one entry of the encyclopedia, namely the ethnographic 
account on the Semai people from Malaysia which is carried out following an 
ethnographic approach, in a similar vein as Douglas Fry work. This society is 
presented as frozen, static, without historical changes, political struggles or 
resistances derived from their interaction with modernity and the state. According to 
Renato Rosaldo (1993) this ethnographic paradigm where the anthropologist is a 
detached observer that extracts raw material to be processed later has already been 
overcome by anthropology. I relied on Alberto Gomes (2012: 1062) work on Semai 
knowledge. The author posits that for the Semai peace is not conceptualized as a 
separate category, but “intertwined and interconnected” with equality and 
sustainability ideals and practices. The author accounts that these practices and beliefs 
are being displaced by the increasing contact with capitalism, modernity, 
commodification, privatization and over-exploitation of their resources.  
As a departing tenet for the next chapter I concluded this section with Santos 
(2007b) distinction between knowledge-as-regulation and knowledge-as-
emancipation. The former conceives knowledge as order and ignorance as disorder, 
whereas the latter conceives knowledge as solidarity and ignorance as colonialism. 
From the four study cases, the main conclusions can be summarized thusly: 
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 These examples show the unequal relation between different forms of 
knowledge. A narrow, positivist view of science pervades, where the 
scientist is the hegemonic subject who orders, labels, categorizes, defines the 
terms of the conversation, and imposes his views on other realities. 
Therefore, cultural recognition does not go hand in hand with 
epistemological recognition. 
 These examples reflect the rigidity of orthopedic thinking, that is, when 
Western concerns and conceptual tools are used to analyze other cultures 
(Santos, 2009). 
 Knowledge-as-order prevails over knowledge-as-emancipation. 
 The proposed intercultural dialogue is turned into a dialogue among peace 
researchers. 
 Peace, singular or plural, is conceived as a universal concept to which other 
cultures will be brought into by assimilation or appropriation. 
 There is a twofold example of “metonymic reason” (Santos, 2004), the type 
of reason that takes the part for the whole, (i) to take science as the only 
valid form of knowledge, (ii) to conceive peace as a universal category that 
can be isolated and objectified. 
 Interculturality is used as raw material to be extracted for the production of 
theory. This denies other cultures agency and reason, positioning them as 
theoretical patients (Guha, 1989; Chakrabarty, 2000; Viveiros de Castro, 
2010).  
 The consequence of this is the exclusion and devaluation of other forms of 
knowledges, silencing and depriving other cultures from the way they 
experience the world.  
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 Different knowledges, practices and ways of being in the world rise different 
questions and propose different and unexpected answers. It is through these 
unexpected dialogues that our own assumptions and certainties can be 
challenged, so that it can be learnt from others. 
 I retake certain scholars (Santos, 2010, 2007b, 2007c; McIntosh, 2012; 
Pannikar, 1999) assertion that tools and spaces for dialogue need to be 
opened up re-integrating science as a part of a broader context of 
knowledges. 
The last chapter proposed to change the mood and to engage in what certain 
scholars have called “a pedagogy of hope” (McIntosh et al., 2012). It departs from 
what Santos (2010) called “sociology of absences, a look at forms of knowledge, 
practices, experiences, and beliefs that have been neglected and made look as non-
existent. It is not a romanticized recovery of lost practices and idyllic lifestyles, but a 
look at the knowledge and practices of people who suffer. Therefore, I endeavored to 
explore certain aspects of Fulani people, concretely Wodaabe Fulani, cosmology, 
knowledge, beliefs, values and practices. To that effect, I have relied on 
anthropological and linguistic accounts, and on texts from Fulani oral tradition, 
initiatory tales and mythologies.  
Wodaabe Fulani inhabit the Southeastern regions of Niger, a Sahelian region 
characterized for low rain rates, inconsistent from year to year, a semi-arid soil, and 
spare vegetation. They are mainly nomadic herders although during severe droughts 
certain groups combine shepherding with agricultural activities, whereas others can 
be found in big cities as migrant workers. During the rainy season, from May to June, 
migrations are intensified, becoming more frequent but covering short distances, 
therefore communities stay closer. During the dry season, long distance migrations 
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take place to normally settle around a well next to agricultural populations. At that 
time, communities are more dispersed and interactions with sedentary social groups 
increase, having a significant economic component.  
The second section of this chapter presented some aspects of Fulani cosmology 
related to the two main elements of their interwoven economic, social, political and 
religious life, the cow and the milk. Besides providing milk, their main source of 
income and nourishment, the relation with the cow is a based on reason as it is on 
emotion. Human qualities are attributed to the cow. It implies a relation with the past 
and the bond to the land through rituals, it is a part of cohesive distributive practices 
in the community, and is a central element of their moral code.  Similarly, milk 
occupies a central place in Fulani society, as expressed in their mythology and 
practices. Fulani knowledge and social organization revolve around obtaining, 
processing and commercializing milk. 
In this section I focused on the relations of nomadic herders with the state and 
development agencies. Certain scholars (Pouillo, 1990) argument that nomadic 
people employ an isolation strategy that leads to stagnant and retarded economies 
(Khazanov, 2001). However, following a political ecology approach (Robbins, 2012), 
rather this isolation could be considered as marginalization, which is derived from 
unequal power relations rather than from the absence of contact. Cooperative 
relations are established with neighboring populations as well as within the 
community (Loftsdottir, 2001). I accounted how several state and development 
projects to settle Fulani herders and to engage them in the intensive exploitation for 
meat market have found unexpected responses and resistances from Fulani part, not 
because of an obstinate traditionalism, but because their diverse strategies for 
resource management have revealed to suit better to the context (Pouillon, 1990). 
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The third section covered Fulani herders social organization and focused on 
their moral code, pulaaku, which is used to avoid conflict, as a tool for conflict 
resolution, and it has a political character too since it is employed as a cohesive tool 
to avoid the intervention of authorizes which, in the context of the tensions with the 
state, would affect the community negatively, in economic terms and the level of 
autonomy (Schareika, 2010). 
The last section focused upon how Wodaabe Fulani relations with the 
environment, connection with the land, and their conceptualization of place are 
embedded in their everyday activities. In Fulani oral tradition it is enhanced the 
importance of an harmonious and respectful relation with the environment. The 
human being as a part of nature does not occupy a dominant position but plays the 
role of caretaker. To that effect the human being has been bestowed with a partial 
knowledge, not the totality (Amogou, 2007). As it has been argued throughout this 
chapter, the cattle, through their participation in rituals and by their own qualities, 
play an intermediary role in many aspects of Fulani life, such as the relations with the 
past, with birth and death, and with the land. In that sense, they act as a mediators 
between what is considered the unknown and the unsafe, laddu, and gari, “the place 
where people sit” (Loftsdottird, 2001) that not consist in a stop-over of a nomadic 
life, but places grounded on multiple relations, that spring from an intimate, sentient 
knowledge, which is linked to a way of being in the world (Ingold, 2011).  Thereon, I 
established a comparison with other neglected tradition, namely the German 
Heimatkunde and Aymara cosmology that share similar concerns concerning the 
intimacy of the connection to the land. 
I drew on ethnologists Ullrich Kockel (2012, 2010) call for a revision and the 
reestablishment of Heimatkunde, the deep knowledge of a place “by living oneself 
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into it”, a concept that once was part of the school curricula, to be later vilified after 
being appropriated and misused by regionalists and the Nazis. Kockel proposes a 
political and ecological reconceptualization of Heimat, the place where we come from 
or towards, and Hiesige, from-here-ness, out of an inclusive ecological 
understanding, beyond ethnicity, nationality or religion. 
Aymara cosmology was brought into this chapter through the work of 
Argentinian philosopher and ethnographer Rodolfo Kusch (2010). Although in the 
core of the author’s work lies an epistemological de-linking approach, in tune with 
other Latin American post-colonial scholars discussed in the first chapter such as 
Walter Mignolo, I contended that some aspects of his work can be used to establish 
dialogic relations rather than absolute ruptures. The author compares the two Spanish 
verbs ser and estar, to contrast between the Latin American city dweller and the 
indigenous way of situating oneself in the world. For the author the verb estar is 
closer to Aymara sensitivity represented by the verb utchata, associated with home, 
womb, germination and shelter. This implies a non-instrumental approach to the 
world, not conceived as an external reality, but a sensitive understanding of the it that 
includes the constant instability (kuty) of the here and now of existence (pacha), and 
responds to it inwardly, at an individual and a communal level, rather than by 
imposing oneself over the external reality. 
Finally I related these concerns to peace studies as expressed by Martínez 
Guzmán (2001, 2009) epistemological turn. From his relational understanding of 
peace, he emphasizes the importance of place in contrast to the abstract, empty and 
homogenizing space, for the intersection of human relations allows to recognize the 
multiplicity of identities. Furthermore, the author stresses the earthly, fragile 
condition of the human being as an integral part of nature. Guzmán outlines the 
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central role of the relationships between humans and with nature, rather than between 
subjects and objects.  
To conclude this chapter, I do not contend that Fulani practices, Aymara or 
Heimatkunde conceptions can be transposed from one context to another. However, 
as Gomes (2012) states, if we look at the level of values, these challenge dominant 
economic and ecologic narratives. These forms of being in the world, of connecting  
to the land, of relating to the mode of production, of sensing the fragility of the 
human condition and its environment, outline a sense of togetherness that contrasts 
with the values of competition and alienation in which we are imbued. 
Concerning unequal epistemic relations, and following Santos (2011) following 
Santos (2010) line, in contrast to the positivist attitude that freezes the other, the fact 
of recognizing that these absent experiences produce knowledge, a knowledge that 
allows them to actively inquire back the dominant position, a knowledge that can 
gather these experiences together around similar, shared concerns, has already 
implications for the displacement of these and other imbalanced relations. 
Limitations  
This study presents certain limitations. The four case analyzed in the second 
chapter may not be a large enough sample to represent the situation of the discipline 
concerning interculturality. Although I tried to reflect the interdisciplinary character 
of peace studies, an analysis of interculturality from the contributions of religion 
studies could have been included.  Time constraints impeded to carry out a content 
analysis of peace journals. By analyzing the presence and absence of non-Western 
forms of peace, and their epistemological treatment, in current peace research, a 
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better view would have been obtained of the dominant concepts of peace and 
epistemological currents of the discipline. 
The chapter on Wodaabe Fulani was focused on nomadic herders, who 
constitute a vast majority of the group, mentioning only other economic strategies 
that they employ, among them, urban migration. To broaden the research by means of 
an intersectional approach that provides more and deeper accounts of urban migrants’ 
perspectives would have shed light on other realities.   
Concluding Remarks 
In the introduction, I quoted McIntosh’s (2012) assertion that indigenous 
knowledge challenge the compartmentalized assumptions and paradigms of academic 
knowledge. However, the challenge is twofold. On one side, it challenges our 
epistemological and ontological imagination, on the other side, and closely related to 
it, there is a political challenge, a call for recognition as producers of valid 
knowledge, an assertion for presence as a part of the conversation, rather than apart 
from it (Praeg, 2014). 
As it has been discussed, Western traditions have concealed their ethno-
specificity behind claims for objectivity, neutrality, detachment, rigor and 
universality, values which have been contested by several epistemological revisions 
proposed within peace studies (Martínez Guzmán, 2001; Galtung, 1996). 
The epistemological debate, albeit rich and enriching, has mostly revolved 
around the different forms of doing science. This may definitely have consequences 
in the relation of the discipline with other forms of producing knowledge, but in my 
opinion, it demands another debate. The work of Martínez Guzmán in that sense, 
expressing the commitment with vernacular knowledges, the importance of 
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interculturality, the need for dialogue in order to learn from others so that we can put 
into question our assumptions, and warning against assimilation may represent a 
starting point.  
The four case studies analyzed, although a small sample, may indicate that 
more steps may be needed so that the intercultural dialogue can happen. If dialogue is 
based on listening, as much as on talking, a first step would be to rethink the frame, 
the terms of the dialogue, so that the parts can express themselves on their own terms. 
 In those four cases, what defined the terms of the conversation was peace, 
assumed as the a priori common language. As Praeg (2014: 13), observes, 
historically marginalized traditions have had no choice but to depart from the 
recognition of their thought as ethno-specific, “which is the very condition, the sine 
qua non, upon which a conversation between equals who are not yet equals must be 
premised.” 
 If, as it was contended, to ask what peace is, is a Western question, with all that 
it involves and conceals, and if different experiences raise different questions and 
different answers, the first step would imply to look for new questions and to listen to 
different and unexpected answers. How to look for new questions may involve to 
engage in a critical and introspective analysis that leads to overcome the cultural 
topoi (Panikkar, 1999:27), the dominant and naturalized premises of the discipline, 
which impend from listening and hearing what the others are saying. 
.  Further research 
Since dialogue is a never-ending practice and process, this thesis represents a 
mere foundation from which it can be departed in different directions: 
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• Considering the limitations of this study, a more in-depth analysis of 
interculturality in peace studies, with a larger sample and a content analysis could be 
carried out. In it, some development texts and theoretical proposals could be included.  
As it was stated in the limitations, an intersectional approach that focuses on Fulani 
migrant workers community, alongside with a deeper reading of oral tradition and 
literature in general.  
• Similar explorations of human diversity could be carried out inquiring on 
concepts like Asabyyah, and worldviews such as Ubuntu, or Sumak Kawasay, that 
not only have ontological and ethical, but also have politicallly emancipatory 
implications.  
• In order to move from theory to practice, it can be interesting to analyze 
how might the university, as the hegemonic institution of knowledge, re-think its 
role in subverting asymmetrical epistemic relations, beyond individual research, 
to actively promote intercultural dialogues, translations, and spaces of 
encounters. To that effect, the Popular University of Social Movements in Brazil 
could be a starting point of the analysis. 
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